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Abstract
What is the Cost of Sadness? Age Differences in Risky Medical Decision Making
Jenna Wilson
It's unknown how a sadness induction affects risky decision making within the medical domain,
as well as whether the cognitive appraisal tendencies of uncertainty and situational control,
which are theorized to underlie sadness, explain why sadness is related to subsequent decision
making. Additionally, although initial work suggests that age differences in risky decision
making may not exist within the medical domain, this limited work has only used one measure of
risky medical decision making (e.g., Butler et al., 2012; Hanoch et al., 2018; Rosman et al.,
2013). The first aim of the current study was to examine the effect of a sadness induction on
risky medical decision making, and to explore whether the appraisal tendencies of uncertainty
and situational control explained the link between sadness and decision making. The second aim
of the current study was to examine the association between age and risky medical decision
making utilizing a different measure of medical risk taking than has been used previously. The
third aim of the current study was to explore whether age moderated the association between the
sad video condition and risky medical decision making, as well as the association between the
sad video condition and appraisals of situational control. Younger (aged 18-35) and older (aged
60-89) adults from the U.S. (N = 270; 51.5% female; 77% White) were recruited online via
CloudResearch. Participants were randomly assigned to either a sad condition or neutral control
condition and watched a short video clip. Participants then read three hypothetical medical
decision scenarios that described being diagnosed with either cancer, a stroke, or an ankle
fracture. After each scenario, participants were presented with two treatment options – Treatment
A was lower risk and Treatment B was higher risk. For each decision scenario, participants rated
their likelihood to choose Treatment A relative to Treatment B, as well as answered questions
about their appraisals of uncertainty and situational control related to the treatment outcomes.
Older adults were less likely to choose the riskier treatment option (Treatment B) than younger
adults. However, this finding was no longer significant after accounting for age differences in
baseline negative affect, such that older adults reported less negative affect at baseline than
younger adults. The sad video induction, compared to the neutral control condition, did not have
a significant effect on risky medical decisions, but an exploratory analysis showed that baseline
sadness was related to greater risky medical decision making. However, the appraisal tendencies
did not statistically account for why baseline sadness was related to risky medical decisions.
Additionally, age moderated the association between the sad video condition and appraisals of
situational control, such that older adults in the sad condition reported higher appraisals of
situational control than older adults in the neutral condition. Together, the findings suggest that
baseline sadness is related to greater risk taking, but it’s unclear why since the appraisals
tendencies did not explain this association. Moreover, age is not related to risky medical decision
making after accounting for age differences in affect.
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What is the Cost of Sadness? Age Differences in Risky Medical Decision Making
The diagnosis of a serious illness or injury, possibly incurable, causes people to make
high-stake medical decisions while often feeling powerless and uncertain (Ellis et al., 2019).
Although sadness has been posited to be an emotion of particular relevance in the domain of
risky medical decision making (Derry et al., 2019), empirical work has not yet tested the effect
of sadness on risky medical decisions. Further, theory argues that sadness is characterized by
cognitive appraisal tendencies of uncertainty and situational control, which subsequently lead to
decisions that are in line with the appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). But, whether
these appraisal tendencies explain the association between sadness and risky decision making has
yet to be tested. The first aim of the current study was to examine the effect of a sadness
induction on risky medical decision making, and to explore whether the appraisal tendencies of
uncertainty and situational control explained the link between sadness and decision making.
Additionally, as the population age continues to increase (He et al., 2015), and those
older in age typically face more medical decisions than those younger in age (Leventhal et al.,
2015), it is critical to understand how age is associated with risky medical decision making.
Although some research suggests that there may not be age differences in the domain of medical
decision making (e.g., Butler et al., 2012; Hanoch et al., 2018), this research is limited. The
second aim of the current study was to examine the association between age and risky medical
decision making. Further, theory suggests that sadness is a highly salient emotion among older
relative to younger adults (Kunzmann et al., 2014). Initial empirical work showed that older
adults were less risk taking than younger adults after a sadness induction (Chou et al., 2007),
which suggests that age may moderate the association between sadness and risky decision
making. Additionally, there tends to be a higher prevalence of declines across domains (e.g.,
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health) in older adulthood compared to younger adulthood, which has been posited to result in
lower personal control among older adults (Kunzmann et al., 2014). Thus, age may also
moderate the association between sadness and appraisals of situational control. Therefore, the
third aim of the current study was to explore whether age moderated the association between the
sad video condition and risky medical decision making, as well as the association between the
sad video condition and appraisals of situational control.
Affect and Risky Medical Decisions
Decisions related to health are common across adulthood and often have consequential
impacts on the quality and trajectory of well-being (Carpenter & Niedenthal, 2018). Many
medical decisions involve high-stakes, such as those related to the diagnosis and treatment of an
illness or injury. While there has been an increasing emphasis on patient autonomy within the
U.S. healthcare system (Botti & Iyengar, 2006), patients and their families often lack sufficient
medical knowledge and experience, which makes them vulnerable to making uninformed
predictions or having unrealistic expectations about the outcomes of a treatment (Ferrer & Ellis,
2019). Further, many medical choices are complex and involve high levels of uncertainty, thus
posing more of a challenge to patients (Ellis et al., 2018; Ferrer & Ellis, 2019). Due to the
complexity in medical decision making, it is critical to examine what factors may influence these
decisions.
Medical decisions tend to have an affective component, such that people rarely make
these decisions in the absence of emotion (Ferrer & Mendes, 2018). More commonly, these
decisions are made in negative affective states after receiving unpleasant and distressing news
related to a diagnosis or presentation of treatment options (Ferrer & Mendes, 2018). Sadness is
one of the most commonly experienced negative emotions (Bryant & Zillman, 1984; Lerner &
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Tiedens, 2006) and has been acknowledged as a particularly relevant emotion in the domain of
medical decision making (Derry et al., 2019; Edlund & Sneed, 1989). Researchers argue that
sadness is a ‘normal’ or natural response when reacting to discouraging life events, such as the
diagnosis of a medical condition (Lokko & Stern, 2014).
Moreover, trying to understand the risks and benefits of medical decisions can be
emotional for the decision maker, ultimately resulting in altered and biased perceptions
(Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2010). This is important to consider because these negative affective
states may overly impact a patient’s treatment decision, and consequently result in later regret
(Ferrer & Ellis, 2019). Understanding the implications of how emotional states, such as sadness,
influence medical decisions can inform healthcare policies. For example, medical decisions can
be guided under a decision architecture that considers a patient’s emotional state (Ferrer et al.,
2016), and thus, tailors discussions about treatment options accordingly.
Theoretical framework. Within the field of decision science, considering the relation
between specific, or discrete, emotions and decisions is relatively recent. The appraisal tendency
framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) posits that there are central cognitive appraisal
dimensions that underlie an emotion and result in an implicit predisposition to judge subsequent
situations in line with the cognitive appraisals that characterize that emotion (Lerner & Tiedens,
2006). For example, an individual may experience sadness after being diagnosed with cancer,
and consequently, the appraisal tendencies activated by sadness will carry over and influence
subsequent decisions.
Smith and Ellsworth (1985) provided the groundwork for emotions and appraisal
dimensions by conducting a study that looked at how 15 different emotions mapped onto six
appraisal dimensions by running Symmetric Individual Differences Multidimensional Scaling
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(SINDSCAL). They showed that sadness is an emotion that is characterized by high appraisals of
situational control, a sense that outcomes are based on factors beyond individual control (e.g.,
fate), and uncertainty due to the perception that negative events are unpredictable (Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985). Thus, theoretically, after a sadness induction, an individual will make
subsequent decisions while experiencing high levels of uncertainty and situational control, and
these appraisal tendencies should explain the link between sadness and the decisions made.
Empirical work exploring the effects of sadness on decision making is limited and
suggests that sadness is related to less risk-taking behavior (e.g., Cryder et al., 2008; Lerner et
al., 2013). However, and the majority of this research has focused on financial decisions. One
study showed that young adults induced to feel sad were less risk taking when making lottery
choices than those in a neutral condition (Treffers et al., 2012). Similarly, another study found
that young adults induced to feel sad showed less risk taking on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART), which involves earning hypothetical tokens, than those induced to feel angry (Szasz et
al., 2016). Young adults induced to feel sad were also less risk taking when presented with
hypothetical life dilemmas relative to those in neutral and happy conditions (Chou et al., 2007).
Despite the real-world relevance of how sadness may affect risky medical decisions, this remains
an area largely understudied.
Based on prior research conducted in other decision domains, it follows that sadness
should be related to less risky medical decision making. Therefore, when presented with a higher
risk medical treatment option versus a lower risk treatment option, an individual who is in a sad
condition should be more likely to choose the lower risk treatment compared to an individual in a
neutral condition. Additionally, the appraisal tendency framework posits that an individual
induced to feel sad should judge subsequent situations and decisions in line with the cognitive
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appraisals that underlie sadness (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Yet, empirical work testing this
proposition are scarce. Thus, it remains unknown whether the appraisal dimensions that underlie
sadness account for why those who are induced to feel sad tend to show less risk-taking
tendencies. Theoretically, appraisal tendencies should explain the association between sadness
and decision making, such that higher appraisals of situational control and uncertainty for those
in the sad condition should be related to less risky medical decision making.
Age and Risky Medical Decisions
There is an abundance of research showing age differences in decision making when
comparing younger and older adults (see Hess et al., 2015; Strough et al., 2020 for reviews).
Medical decisions often increase with age and some have shown that older adults report more
health-related problems than younger adults (Folkman et al., 1987; Hershey et al., 2015).
Medical decisions may also be more challenging and consequential for older adults than younger
adults due to physical and cognitive declines that occur with aging, as well as less time
remaining in life to recover from poor decisions (Agarwal et al., 2009).
A large body of research shows that older adults tend to be less risk taking relative to
younger adults (Josef et al., 2016; Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2016), however, some
studies show that they are equally or more risk taking (Chou et al., 2007; Mather et al., 2012).
Inconsistent patterns within the literature may be due to the varying types of risk measures (e.g.,
self-report versus behavioral; see Mata et al., 2018, for a review) as well as the domain that risk
taking is assessed (e.g., financial, health/safety, medical). Prior work has shown that older adults
tend to be less risk taking than younger adults for decisions related to health and safety, such as
eating foods high in cholesterol and driving a car without a seatbelt (Bonem et al., 2015; Rolison
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et al., 2014; Shook et al., 2019). However, little research has investigated age differences in risky
decisions in the medical domain.
The majority of work on age and risky medical decision making has used the medical
subscale of the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT, Blais & Weber, 2006). Butler et
al. (2012) developed the medical subscale which includes decisions about donating a kidney to a
stranger, giving blood, having knee surgery to relieve arthritis, receiving general anesthesia for
wisdom teeth removal, taking daily medication for allergies, and participating in a clinical trial
for drug effectiveness. Three studies have examined the association between age and risk taking
using the medical subscale and found no age differences (e.g., Butler et al., 2012; Hanoch et al.,
2018; Rosman et al., 2013). Age differences in risky decision making may depend on the
domain. Although this initial evidence suggests that within the medical domain there may not be
age differences, the null findings may reflect issues regarding the validity and internal
consistency of the medical subscale of the DOSPERT.
Most of the items on the medical DOSPERT reflect decisions that are voluntary and do
not necessarily involve high risky procedures (e.g., giving blood) (Hanoch et al., 2013). Further,
some items refer to medical procedures that do not have a direct benefit to the decision maker,
but rather offer benefits to others, such as donating a kidney to a stranger. Hanoch et al. (2018)
showed that perceiving more benefits from the medical decision was related to a greater
likelihood of engaging in risk taking. Moreover, all three studies (e.g., Butler et al., 2012;
Hanoch et al., 2018; Rosman et al., 2013) that explored the association between age and risk
taking using the medical DOSPERT demonstrated low internal consistency among the six items,
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with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.49-0.61.1 Low alphas indicate that the items of the scale
might measure different things and have a small relation with each other (Corbetta, 2003).
Together, the limited research on age and risky medical decision making suggests that
age differences may not exist. However, there are several of limitations with the medical
subscale of the DOSPERT, and this scale also fails to assess the types of risky medical decisions
that patients with critical illnesses (e.g., cancer) face. Therefore, more work investigating age
differences in the domain of medical decisions using a measure that more closely captures
patients’ attitudes towards risky medical options is necessary (Hanoch et al., 2013).
Affect, Age, and Risky Medical Decisions
Researchers have suggested that age may moderate the effects of emotions predicted by
the appraisal tendency framework and have emphasized that health-related decisions are of
particular importance to explore this moderation (Ferrer et al., 2016). Indeed, there are multiple
theoretical perspectives on age-related changes in emotion including the socioemotional
selectivity theory (Carstensent et al., 2003) and the discrete emotions approach (Kunzmann et al.,
2014). While these theories suggest that age would moderate the association between sadness
and risky medical decision making, these are competing theoretical perspectives that would
hypothesize opposing directions of a moderation.
Affect and age. The socioemotional selectivity theory suggests that with increasing age,
there is a shift in time perspective towards the present moment, or “here and now”, which affects
motivational goals (Carstensen et al., 2003). This shift in time perspective is thought to explain

1

In an existing dataset from the Strough/Shook lab, age was not significantly related to the
medical subscale (r = 0.62, p = 0.45). The reliability of the medical subscale was a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.38. Examining the reliability per age group (i.e., younger adults aged 18-36 and older
adults aged 65+ years) showed that Cronbach’s alpha was 0.38 among younger adults and 0.41
among older adults.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

8

why older adults relative to younger adults tend to prioritize positive and avoid negative
experiences to maximize emotional well-being in the present moment (Carstensen, 2006;
Mather, 2012). The socioemotional selectivity theory focuses on the valence of emotions (e.g.,
positive, negative) and suggests that older adults may demonstrate better emotion regulation of
negatively valenced emotions than younger adults.
Despite an increase in health-related problems with increasing age, older adults tend to
have as good, if not better, emotional experiences relative to younger adults (Carstensen et al.,
2000; Carstensen et al., 2003; see Mikels et al., 2015 for a review). For example, older adults
report greater positive affect and life satisfaction and lesser negative affect, anxiety, and
depression compared to younger adults (Carstensen et al., 2000; Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2004;
Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998; Shook et al., 2017; Stone et al., 2010). According to the
socioemotional selectivity theory, older adults are able to regulate their emotional reactions
better than younger adults, and thus, there may be a stronger effect of sadness on younger adults’
risky medical decisions than older adults’ decisions. However, this theory focuses on broad
positive and negative affective dimensions, which may limit the ability to apply this theory when
examining age differences in the functions of specific emotions.
Recently, the discrete emotions approach has been proposed and has specifically focused
on the role of sadness in the life stages of younger adulthood and older adulthood (Kunzmann et
al., 2014). This theory posits that young and older adulthood are two stages in life that are
differentially associated with sadness. Older age is typically associated with a higher prevalence
of losses and declines across domains than in young adulthood, including losses in physical
health and cognitive functioning (e.g., Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997), as well as social losses
such as the death of a friend (e.g., Palmore, 1981). Due to these losses, high appraisals of

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

9

situational control (e.g., fate) are posited to be more accessible in older age than young adulthood
because of a decline in personal control (Kunzmann et al., 2014). Therefore, it has been
suggested that sadness is an emotion that is salient among older adults, and thus, older adults
may show more frequent and intense levels of sadness than younger adults (Kunzmann et al.,
2014).
Empirical work examining age differences in sadness is limited. In a 10-year longitudinal
study of older adults (aged 64-94, M = 72.25 years, SD = 5.81), Wrosch et al. (2018)
demonstrated that the intensity of self-reported sadness increased over time, but only among
those who perceived low levels of control over their life. Other studies have used video clips to
induce sadness and have shown mixed findings. Two studies induced sadness and found that
older adults reported greater sadness than younger adults (Jenkins & Andrews, 2012; Seider et
al., 2011). Another study used two different videos to induce sadness and found that older adults
relative to younger adults reported greater sadness after the video that was age-relevant (i.e.,
about Alzheimer’s disease) but found no age differences after the other video that was
considered age-neutral (i.e., about someone’s father dying) (Kunzmann & Gruhn, 2005). These
findings suggest that the content of the sadness-eliciting stimuli is important to consider when
examining age differences, and that it is important to use stimuli that is relevant to both age
groups. According to the discrete emotions approach, sadness should be more salient and intense
among older adults, and thus, there may be a stronger effect of sadness on older adults’ risky
medical decisions than younger adults’ decisions.
Moderating effects of age. It largely remains unknown how age-related changes in
emotions influence risky decision making. When comparing older adults induced to feel sad
versus those in a neutral and happy condition, Chou et al. (2007) showed that those in the sad
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video condition were less risk taking on a task about hypothetical life dilemmas. Moreover, older
adults in the sad video condition were also less risk taking than younger adults in the sad video
condition (Chou et al., 2007). This initial evidence suggests that age may moderate the
association between sadness and risky decision making. Therefore, older adults in a sad
condition may report less risky medical decisions than younger adults in a sad condition.
Likewise, it is unclear how age-related changes in emotions affect appraisal tendencies.
Situational control is one of the appraisal dimensions that characterizes sadness and is speculated
to explain why sadness is related to less risk taking. Because older adults tend experience a
decline in personal control (Kunzmann et al., 2014) due to a higher prevalence of losses in life
than younger adults (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997), age may moderate the association between
sadness and appraisals of situational control. Therefore, older adults in a sad condition may
report higher appraisals of situational control than younger adults in a sad condition.
Summary
Although there are several negative emotions that a decision maker may experience after
the diagnosis of a medical condition, sadness has been identified as a common emotion within
the domain of medical decisions (Derrye t al., 2019; Lokko & Stern, 2014) as well as among
those older in age (Kunzmann et al., 2014). Therefore, the present study specifically focused on
the role of sadness and its effect on risky medical decision making among younger and older
adults. Based on limited empirical research inducing sadness (e.g., Chou et al., 2007; Treffers et
al., 2016), it was expected that after a sadness induction, participants would be less risk taking
relative to participants in a neutral condition. Moreover, there is some evidence (e.g., Chou et al.,
2007) that age may moderate the association between sadness and risk taking. Indeed, it was
expected that older adults in the sad condition would be less risk taking than younger adults in
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the sad condition. Additionally, theory posits that sadness is characterized by high appraisal
tendencies of uncertainty and situational control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), which are thought to
explain the link between sadness and subsequent decision making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Thus, it was expected that participants in the sad condition would report high appraisals of
uncertainty and situational control, which would explain why they were less risk taking relative
to those in the neutral condition. Lastly, theoretical work (Kunzmann et al., 2014) suggests that
age may moderate the association between sadness and appraisals of situational control. Based
on the tenets of the discrete emotions approach, it was expected that older adults in the sad
condition would report higher appraisals of situational control than younger adults in the sad
condition. See Figure 1 for the hypothesized moderated mediation model of the present study.
Research Aims and Hypotheses
Research Aim 1. The first aim of the current study was to examine the effect of video condition
on risky medical decision making and explore whether the appraisal tendencies of uncertainty
and situational control accounted for this association.
Hypothesis 1a. Because both younger and older adults induced to feel sad have shown
less risk taking tendencies than those in a neutral video condition (Chou et al., 2007;
Treffers et al., 2012), it was hypothesized that participants in the sad video condition
would make less risky medical decisions than those in the neutral video condition.
Hypothesis 1b: Sadness is characterized by appraisal dimensions of uncertainty and
situational control, which have been proposed to explain why sadness is related to
subsequent decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). It was hypothesized that the sad
video condition would no longer be significantly associated with less risky medical
decisions when controlling for higher appraisals of situational control and uncertainty.
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Research Aim 2. The second aim of the current study was to examine the association between
age and risky medical decision making.
Hypothesis 2. Although research on age and risky medical decision making suggests that
there may not be age differences in this domain (Butler et al., 2012; Hanoch et al., 2018;
Rosman et al., 2013), there are limitations to using the medical subscale of the
DOSPERT which may account for the lack of age differences. Research on age and
health/safety decisions suggests that older adults are less risk taking than younger adults
(Bonem et al., 2015; Rolison et al., 2013; Shook et al., 2019). Therefore, utilizing a
different measure of risky medical decision making may shed light that older adults are
less risk taking in the medical domain, too. It was hypothesized that older adults would
make less risky medical decisions than younger adults.
Research Aim 3. The third aim of the current study was to examine the effect of age as a
moderator on the association between video condition and risky decision making, as well as
video condition and appraisals of situational control.
Hypothesis 3a. The discrete emotions approach suggests that sadness may be more
salient and intense in older adults relative to younger adults (Kunzmann et al., 2014).
Further, one study showed that older adults in a sad video condition were less risk taking
than younger adults in the sad video condition (Chou et al., 2007). Therefore, it was
hypothesized that older adults in the sad condition would make less risky medical
decisions than younger adults in the sad condition.
Hypothesis 3b. Older adults tend to experience a higher prevalence of losses in life than
younger adults (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997), as well as a decline in personal control
(Kunzmann et al., 2014). Therefore, it was hypothesized that older adults in the sad
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condition would report higher appraisals of situational control than younger adults in the
sad condition.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 300) living within the United States were recruited through
CloudResearch. CloudResearch is a crowdsourcing site that is connected to Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk programming interface, but allows researchers more control over the exclusion
criteria. A stratified sampling strategy was used to recruit an age and sex diverse sample: 150
younger adults (aged 18-35; 75 male, 75 female) and 150 older adults (aged 60+; 75 male, 75
female). A power analysis (G*Power; Erdfelder et al., 1996) indicated that a sample size of 166
was required to detect an effect of .10 for a linear multiple regression testing for significant R2
increase, assuming power is .80 and α = .05.
All participants were from the U.S. and had HIT approval rates of 95% or higher. Using
the CloudResearch pro features, responses from the same IP address and same geolocation were
blocked to reduce duplicate responses and potential bots from taking the survey. Participants
were asked to report their current age two different times throughout the survey. Seven
participants inconsistently reported their age and were excluded from analyses. Another attention
check was placed at the end of the survey in the form of an open-ended question. This attention
check asked participants to describe the video clip they watched at the beginning of the survey.
Twenty-three participants failed this attention check (e.g., blank answer, non-sensical response)
and were excluded from analyses. Thus, the sample (N = 270) consisted of 128 younger adults
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(aged 18-35, M = 28.91, SD = 3.88) and 142 older adults (aged 60-89, M = 66.92, SD = 5.63).2
There were a relatively equal number of females (51.5%) and males (47.0%), with 1.5%
identifying as other. Participants were mostly White (77%). For additional demographic
information see Table 1.
Procedure
After providing consent, participants first reported their age and sex. They then
completed an assessment of baseline affect. Next, participants were randomly assigned to the sad
or neutral video condition and watched the designated video clip. After watching the video,
participants were randomly presented with the three risky medical decision making scenarios and
measures of appraisal tendencies for each scenario.1 The order in which participants received
each decision making scenario was recorded on Qualtrics. Next, participants were presented with
measures to assess perceptions of risks and benefits of Treatment B (higher risk option) relative
to Treatment A (lower risk option). Then, participants completed measures of familiarity with
the medical scenarios and treatments, perceived health, health consciousness, health anxiety, and
social support in a randomized order. Demographic questions were presented last. All study

2

One attention check was embedded approximately mid-way through the survey and stated
“Please click on the answer ‘Agree’”. No participants failed this attention check. Chi-square
analyses revealed that participants excluded (n = 30) did not significantly differ from the final
sample (n = 270) based on video condition, sex, race, income, education, or marital status (ps >
.05). However, chi-square analyses showed that the groups did significantly differ based on age
group (p < .05), such that more younger adults were excluded than older adults. Additionally, ttests showed that those who were excluded reported significantly greater risky decision making
(t(298) = -4.88, p < .001), higher appraisals of uncertainty (t(47.24) = -2.34, p = .02), and higher
appraisals of situation control (t(39.86) = -5.44, p < .001) compared to the final sample.
1
Three ANOVAs were conducted to test for potential order effects. The order in which
participants were presented with the risky decision scenarios was entered as the IV and risky
decision making, uncertainty, and situational control were entered as the DV of each ANOVA.
There was not a significant effect on overall risky decision making (F(2, 267) = 0.60, p = .55),
appraisals of uncertainty (F(2, 267) = 0.32, p = .73) or appraisals of situational control (F(2, 267)
= 0.79, p = .46).
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sessions took approximately 35 minutes to complete. Each participant received $1.00 U.S. for
their participation.
Participants were recruited to sign up for the study via CloudResearch and were
automatically redirected to complete the study through Qualtrics. The use of crowdsourcing sites
allows for rapid collection of data and typically provides a large, diverse participant pool
(Buhrmester et al., 2016). Data from crowdsourcing sites has also shown to be as reliable and
valid as data obtained through traditional methods (Buhrmester et al., 2016). Data from MTurk
typically provides a more demographically diverse participant pool than community samples
(Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Weigold et al., 2013).
Materials
Participants were randomly assigned to the neutral or sad video condition. There were 65
younger and 82 older adults in the neutral video condition and 78 younger and 68 older adults in
the sad video condition.
Sad video condition. A pilot study was conducted using a U.S. sample of younger and
older adults (Appendix P). Two videos, The Champ and Marley and Me, were used to induce
sadness. There were no age differences in self-reported sadness following the videos. Because
age was a main variable of interest for the present study, it was important to identify an affective
stimulus that did not produce an age effect. Additionally, participants who watched Marley and
Me reported greater sadness following the video than those who watched The Champ. Thus,
Marley and Me was chosen for the purpose of the present study because the video did not
produce an age effect and appeared to induce greater sadness than the other video. This 2-minute
clip shows a family having to put down their dog because he is sick. This video has also been
used in prior research (Schwartz et al., 2018).
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Neutral video condition. In the control condition, participants watched a 2 minute video
clip about the Great Barrier Reef from a National Geographic special. This clip is considered to
induce a neutral state. Although the pilot study indicated that younger adults reported a greater
neutral state (e.g., unemotional, indifferent) than older adults after watching the video (Appendix
P), this video has been used as a control condition in prior work that has also induced sadness in
U.S. samples (Cryder et al., 2008; Lerner et al., 2004; 2013).
Measures
Baseline affect. An adapted version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was used to assess affect at baseline (Appendix A). The original
version of the PANAS does not include multiple adjective to assess sadness or a neutral state.
Thus, six additional adjectives were included (i.e., sad, unhappy, blue, neutral, indifferent,
unemotional) that reflect sadness and a neutral state. Six original adjectives (i.e., guilty,
determined, hostile, ashamed, proud, active) from the PANAS were removed to reduce
participant burden and because these adjectives were unrelated to the main study goals.
Participants rated the extent to which they felt seven positive (e.g., excited, inspired) and seven
negative emotions (e.g., sad, afraid) on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5
(extremely). Items were averaged to compute total positive (a = .87) and negative (a = .93)
affect scores, and higher scores indicated more positive and negative affect, respectively.
A composite baseline sadness score was also created by summing the adjectives of sad,
unhappy, and blue (a = .90). Sadness at baseline was used as an alternative indicator to test the
larger conceptual model.
Risky medical decisions. Participants were presented with three hypothetical medical
decision scenarios (Appendix B). Two scenarios were about a serious medical illness and have
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been used in prior research (i.e., cancer, stroke; Bookwala et al., 2001; Strough et al., under
review). One additional scenario was created for the purpose of the present study to be equally
relevant for people of different ages and was about treatment options for an ankle fracture caused
during a car accident. For each scenario, there were two treatment options - Treatment A was
lower risk and Treatment B was higher risk. Participants rated their likelihood to choose
Treatment A relative to Treatment B on a scale from 1 (most likely to choose Treatment A) to 6
(most likely to choose Treatment B). All scenarios specified that both treatment options were
fully covered by insurance to eliminate potential financial burden related to choosing a treatment.
Scores were averaged across scenarios and higher scores indicated greater risk taking (a = .69).
Appraisal tendencies. Participants answered items to assess the appraisal tendencies of
uncertainty and situational control. Following each of the three medical decision scenarios,
participants answered two questions adapted from Ellsworth and Smiths’ (1988) Appraisal
Questionnaire to assess uncertainty (Appendix C). Each question was rated on a scale from 1
(not at all) to 11 (extremely). Participants were asked “How well could you predict the
effectiveness of the treatment in this situation?” and “How uncertain were you about the
effectiveness of the treatment in this situation?”. The six items (2 items per decision scenario)
were averaged to create a total uncertainty score (a = .70). Higher scores reflected higher
appraisals of uncertainty.
Following each medical decision scenario, participants were presented with three
statements that assessed situational control (Appendix C). These items were created for the
purpose of the present study and were modeled off of Levenson’s (1972) locus of control
measure, as well as Wallston and Wallston’s (1978) health locus of control measure. After each
medical decision scenario, participants responded to the following: “Whether or not the
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treatment is effective is mostly a matter of luck,” “The effectiveness of the treatment is greatly
influenced by fate,” and “The effectiveness of the treatment is beyond any human’s control” on a
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The nine items were averaged to create a
total situational control score (a = .95) and higher scores reflected higher appraisals of
situational control.
Perception of medical risks. Participants were asked to rate how risky they perceived
each treatment on a scale from 0 (not at all risky) to 4 (very risky) (Weber et al., 2002)
(Appendix D). This was used as a manipulation check to ensure that participants perceived the
low-risk treatments to be significantly less risky than the high-risk treatment counterparts. A
difference score was computed for the perceived riskiness of the treatment options for the three
medical scenarios by subtracting Treatment A from Treatment B. A total perceived riskiness
score was then computed by summing the three difference scores. Higher scores indicated that
participants perceived Treatment B (higher risk option) to involve greater risks relative to
Treatment A (lower risk option).
Benefits of medical risks. Participants were asked to rate how much benefit, in general,
they perceived each treatment to have on a scale from 0 (no benefits at all) to 4 (great benefits)
(Weber et al., 2002) (Appendix E). This was used to examine whether participants perceived the
low-risk treatments to be significantly less beneficial than the high-risk treatment counterparts,
because research has shown that participants are more likely to engage in risky behavior when
they perceive more benefits (Hanoch et al., 2018). A difference score was computed for the
perceived benefits of the treatment options for the three medical scenarios by subtracting
Treatment A from Treatment B. A total perceived benefits score was then computed by summing
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the three difference scores. Higher scores indicated that participants perceived Treatment B
(higher risk option) to involve greater benefits relative to Treatment A (lower risk option).
Demographic information. Participants provided basic demographic information such
as their age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, employment status, marital status, and income
(Appendix J).
Covariates
Familiarity with medical scenarios and treatments. Participants reported whether they
and someone they knew has been diagnosed with/had the three medical illnesses/conditions
(Appendix F). Response options for each illness/condition were “yes” or “no”. Responses of
“yes” were coded as 1 and responses as “no” were coded as 0. A self-illness score was created by
taking a sum across the three items. Higher scores indicated that participants had been
diagnosed/had more medical conditions. An other-illness score was also created by taking a sum
across the three items. Higher scores indicated that participants knew more people whom have
been diagnosed/had more medical conditions.
Participants also reported whether they and someone they knew had experienced any of
the six treatment options (Appendix F). Response options for each treatment were “yes” or “no.”
Responses of “yes” were coded as 1 and responses as “no” were coded as 0. A self-treatment
score was created by taking a sum across the six items. Higher scores indicated that participants
had more experience with the treatment options. An other-treatment score was created by taking
a sum across the six items. Higher scores indicated that participants knew people who had more
experience with the treatment options.
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Perceived health (Lawton et al., 1982). One item (i.e., “How would you rate your overall
health at the present time?”) assessed participants’ current health (Appendix G). Participants
rated their health on a scale from 1 (excellent) to 4 (poor). The item was reverse scored and
higher scores indicated better current health.
Health Consciousness (HC; Hong, 2009). Participants completed the 11-item health
consciousness scale to assess their orientation towards their overall health on a scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (Appendix H). This scale measured three components of
health consciousness: self-health awareness (e.g., “I’m very self-conscious about my health.”),
personal responsibility (e.g., “Good health takes active participation on my part.”), and health
motivation (e.g., “Living life without disease and illness is very important to me.”). Combing all
three components for a total score has demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α = 0.85;
Hong, 2009). A mean score was computed across all items and higher scores indicated greater
health consciousness (a = .80).
Short Health Anxiety Inventory (SHAI; Salkovskis et al., 2002). Participants completed
the 4-item, self-report measure of health anxiety related to the negative consequences of
becoming ill (Appendix I). This 4-item scale has demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α
= 0.72; Salkovskis et al., 2002). Each item had four statements and participants were instructed
to select which statement best described their feelings over the past 6 months. An example
question consists of the following statements: “A serious illness would ruin some aspect of my
life”; “A serious illness would ruin many aspects of my life”; “A serious illness would ruin
almost every aspect of my life”; “A serious illness would ruin every aspect of my life.”
Participants were allowed to select multiple statements for each question. Each question was
scored from 0 to 3. When multiple statements were endorsed, the score for the highest statement

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

21

was used. A mean score was computed and higher scores reflected greater health anxiety about
the negative consequences of becoming ill (a = .76).
Social support (Zimet et al., 1988). The 12-item self-report measure of perceived social
support was used to assess participants’ perceptions of available support from friends, family,
and significant others. Participants rated how they felt about each item (“I get the emotional help
and support I need from my family”) on a scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 (very
strongly agree). A total score was computed by averaging all items, and higher scores indicated
greater perceived social support (a = .95).
Results
Preliminary Analysis
Before conducting the main analyses, checks for missingness and assumptions of
normality were conducted. There were no missing data on any key study variable. Health anxiety
and social support were skewed. A square root transformation was applied to health anxiety
which normalized its distribution. However, when social support was transformed using a square
root, log, or inverse transformation, it remained skewed. Baseline negative affect and baseline
sadness were also both skewed and kurtotic. When each was transformed using a square root,
log, or inverse transformation, both remained skewed. When the transformed variables for health
anxiety, social support, baseline negative affect, and baseline sadness were included in main
analyses instead of untransformed variables the results did not significantly change. For this
reason, the raw variables without transformations were reported in the results. Descriptive
statistics for key study variables for each age group (younger, older) and video condition
(neutral, sad) can be found in Table 2.3

3

Descriptive statistics for individual risky medical decision scenarios can be found in Table S1.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

22

Baseline affect. Two independent t-test were conducted to assess differences in baseline
positive and negative affect to check that the neutral and sad video conditions did not differ at
baseline. Condition (sad, neutral) was entered as the independent variable and affect (i.e.,
positive or negative) was the dependent variable. There were no significant differences in
baseline positive (t(268) = 1.26, p = .21) or negative (t(268) = 0.06, p = .96) affect between the
video conditions.
Two additional independent t-test were conducted to assess differences in baseline
positive and negative affect to check for age differences in affect at baseline. Age group
(younger, older) was entered as the independent variable and affect (i.e., positive or negative)
was the dependent variable. There was a significant difference between younger and older adults
on baseline positive affect, t(268) = -2.11, p = .04. Older adults (M = 3.21, SD = 0.78) reported
significantly higher levels of positive affect than younger adults (M = 2.99, SD = 0.93).
Additionally, younger adults (M = 1.75, SD = 0.85) reported significantly higher levels of
negative affect than older adults (M = 1.20, SD = 0.52), t(268) = 6.53, p < .001. Therefore, main
analyses were conducted controlling for baseline positive and negative affect.
Manipulation check. To check whether participants perceived the higher risk treatment
option as more risky than the lower risk treatment option, a paired samples t-tests was conducted
for each of the three medical scenarios (see Table 3).4 For all three decision scenarios (i.e.,
stroke, cancer, ankle fracture), participants perceived Treatment B (higher risk option) as

4

To check whether participants perceived the higher risk treatment option as more beneficial
than the lower risk treatment option, a paired samples t-tests was conducted for each of the three
medical scenarios (see Table 3). For the stroke and ankle fracture scenarios, participants
perceived Treatment A (lower risk option) as significantly more beneficial than Treatment B
(higher risk option). There was no significant difference in perceptions of benefits for options to
treat cancer.
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significantly more risky than Treatment A (lower risk option). Thus, the manipulation of the
riskiness of the treatments were deemed to be successful because participants perceived the
higher risk treatment option (Treatment B) as significantly riskier than the lower risk treatment
option (Treatment A).
Covariates. Bivariate correlations among possible covariates including baseline affect,
current health, health consciousness, heath anxiety, familiarity with medical scenarios and
treatment options, and social support were examined in relation to risky medical decision making
(see Table 4). Greater baseline negative affect and greater health anxiety were significantly
correlated with greater risky medical decision making. Less perceived social support was also
significantly correlated with greater risky decision making. Current health, health consciousness,
baseline positive mood and familiarity with medical scenarios and treatment options were not
significantly related to risky medical decision making. Thus, only the potential covariates of
baseline negative affect, health anxiety, and social support were included in subsequent analyses
with risky medical decision making as the outcome.
Demographic characteristics of sex (1 = male, 0 = female), race/ethnicity (1 = white, 0 =
not white), marital status (1 = in a relationship/married, 0 = not), employment status (1 =
employed full-time, 0 = not), working in the medical field (1 = yes, 0 = no), income, and
education were also explored as potential covariates (see Table 5). Those who identified as
White and who were employed full-time reported greater risky decision making. Sex, marital
status, income, education, and working in the medical field were not significantly related to risky
decision making. Thus, only the demographic characteristics of race/ethnicity and employment
status were included as covariates in subsequent analyses with risky medical decision making as
the outcome.
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Main Analyses
It was hypothesized that those in the sad video condition would make less risky medical
decisions than those in the neutral control (Hypothesis 1a), and that older adults would make less
risky medical decisions than younger adults (Hypothesis 2). It was also hypothesized that older
adults in the sad condition would make less risky medical decisions than younger adults in the
sad condition (Hypothesis 3a). To address these hypotheses, an analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) was conducted with condition (neutral, sad) and age group (younger, older) as the
between-subjects factors and risky medical decision making as the dependent variable. Baseline
positive and negative affect, health anxiety, social support, race/ethnicity, and employment status
were entered as covariates (see Table 6). The statistical assumptions to conduct an ANCOVA
were met, and the Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not significant (p = .67) There
were not significant main effects of video condition, F(1, 260) = 0.68, p = .41, or age group, F(1,
260) = 0.19, p = .67.5 There was also not a significant interaction between video condition and
age group, F(1, 260) = 0.76, p = .38. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a, 2, and 3a were not supported.
Hypothesis 1b, which stated that the sad video condition would no longer be significantly
associated with less risky medical decisions when controlling for higher appraisals of situational
control and uncertainty, was dependent on Hypothesis 1a being supported. Thus, Hypothesis 1b
could not be tested. However, while there was not a significant direct effect of video condition
on risky decision making, there still could be an indirect effect through the appraisal tendencies.
So, associations between video condition and the appraisal tendencies were tested (Table 2).

When no covariates were included in the model, there was a significant main effect of age group, F(1,
266) = 6.88, p = .009. Older adults (M = 2.51, SD = 1.36) made less risky decisions than younger adults
(M = 2.95, SD = 1.45). When only negative affect at baseline was included as a covariate, there were no
longer age differences in risky medical decision making. This suggested that age differences in baseline
negative affect statistically accounted for why older adults made less risky decisions than younger adults.
5
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There were no significant differences in appraisals of uncertainty or situational control between
the neutral and sad video conditions. So, video condition (x variable) was not significantly
related to the appraisal dimensions (m variables) nor risky decision making (y variable), and thus,
the assumptions necessary to test for mediation and/or indirect effects were not met and
Hypothesis 1b could not be tested (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
To address Hypothesis 3b, which stated that older adults in the sad condition would
report higher appraisals of situational control than younger adults in the sad condition, an
ANCOVA was conducted. Video condition (neutral, sad) and age group (younger, older) were
entered as the between-subjects factors and appraisals of situational control as the dependent
variable. Baseline positive and negative affect were included as a covariates.6 There was not a
significant main effect of video condition, F(1, 264) = 3.04, p = .08. However, there was a
significant main effect of age group (F(1, 264) = 23.10, p < .001) which was modified by an
interaction with video condition, F(1, 264) = 11.87, p = .001 (see Figure 2). Older adults in the
sad video condition reported significantly higher appraisals of situational control than older
adults in the neutral video condition (see Figure 3). Therefore, although there was a significant
interaction, it was not as predicted and Hypothesis 3b was not supported.
Exploratory Analyses
First risky medical scenario. To test whether there was an effect of video condition on
the first risky medical scenario that participants received, an ANOVA was conducted. Age group
(younger, older), video condition (neutral, sad), and the first risky medical scenario presented (1
= cancer, 2 = stroke, 3 = ankle fracture) were entered as the between-subjects factors and risky
decision making for the first scenario they received was entered as the dependent variable. The

6

The pattern and significance of findings remained the same when covariates were not included.
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main effect of video condition was not significant F(1,258) = 0.42, p = .52, nor were the main
effects of age group or presentation of risky medical scenario (ps > .27). There were also no
significant interactions (ps > .17). Therefore, the video condition did not have an effect on the
first risky medical decision scenario that participants saw.
Conceptual model with baseline sadness. As mentioned above, video condition
(neutral, sad) did not have a significant effect on risky medical decision making nor on the
appraisals tendencies. So, the original conceptual model did not meet the statistical assumptions
to be tested using video condition as an indicator of the emotion ‘sadness’. Therefore, the model
was tested using baseline sadness as an alternative indicator of the emotion ‘sadness’. Thus, the
original hypotheses about the association between sadness and risky decision making, as well as
sadness and the appraisal tendencies were tested with baseline sadness. Video condition was
included as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
Bivariate correlations (Table 4) were first conducted. Hypothesis 1a stated that sadness
would be associated with less risky medical decision making. However, correlations showed that
greater sadness at baseline was significantly related to greater risky medical decision making,
which was the opposite of Hypothesis 1a. Greater sadness at baseline was significantly correlated
with higher appraisals of situational control, as expected, but not associated with appraisals of
uncertainty. Older age was related to less sadness at baseline.
A moderated mediation model was tested using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017;
Model 8) in SPSS to test baseline sadness as an alternative indicator in the conceptual model.
Hypothesis 1b stated that sadness would no longer be significantly associated with less risk
taking after controlling for appraisals of situational control and uncertainty. It was also
hypothesized that the magnitude of the association between sadness and less risk taking would be
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stronger in older adults relative to younger adults (Hypothesis 3a), and that the magnitude of the
association between sadness and higher appraisals of situational control would be stronger in
older adults relative to younger adults (Hypothesis 3b). Sadness at baseline was entered as the
independent variable, appraisals of situational control and uncertainty were entered as the
mediators, age group (younger, older) was entered as a moderator, and risky medical decision
making was the dependent variable (see Figure 4). Video condition, health anxiety, social
support, race, and employment were included as covariates.7
The indirect effect of baseline sadness on risky decision making through appraisals of
uncertainty (b = 0.01, 95% CI [-.03, .07]) and situational control (b = 0.01, 95% CI [-.04, .07])
was not significant. Thus, there was not a significant indirect effect of baseline sadness on risky
decision making through uncertainty and situational control (Hypothesis 1b). The direct effect of
baseline sadness on risky decision making remained significant (b = .27, p = .01). However, as
noted previously, the direction of the association was in the opposite direction than predicted.
The interaction between baseline sadness and age on risky decision making (p = .57) and the
interaction between baseline sadness and age on appraisals of situational control (p = .52) were
not significant. Thus, age did not moderate the association between baseline sadness and risky
medical decision making (Hypothesis 3a), nor did it moderate the association between baseline
sadness and situational control (Hypothesis 3b).
Individual negative affect adjectives. To explore the associations among the seven
negative affect adjectives and the three sadness adjectives at baseline with risky decision making,
bivariate correlations were computed (see Table 7). All 10 adjectives were significantly related
to greater risky decision making. This finding is inconsistent with the appraisal tendency
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The pattern and significance of findings remained the same when covariates were not included.
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framework, which posits that two emotions may be of the same valence, yet give rise to different
cognitive and motivational processes, consequently leading to different decisions (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000; 2001). It is important to note that the magnitude of these correlation coefficients
were small to moderate (rs .18-.31; Cohen, 1988).
Discussion
Risky medical decision making often occurs under a negative affective state and has
consequential impacts on the trajectory of well-being (Carpenter & Niedenthal, 2018; Ferrer &
Mendes, 2018). While these types of decisions are common across adulthood, they often become
more frequent with increasing age (Leventhal et al., 2015). The present findings aimed to address
the shortcomings of the literature by investigating the effect of a sad video induction on risky
medical decision making, as well as the association between age and risky decision making.
Although the sad video induction did not have an effect on decision making, discrete sadness at
baseline was related to greater risky medical decision making, which was opposite of what was
hypothesized. Additionally, while older age was related to less risky medical decision making,
this findings was no longer significant after accounting for baseline negative affect.
Though sadness has been theoretically identified as a discrete emotion that is of particular
relevance in the domain of medical decision making (Derry et al., 2019), the present findings
demonstrate that those who watched the sad video did not significantly differ in risky medical
decision making relative to those who watched the neural video. Limited empirical work has
induced sadness to test the effect on risky decision making. However, some evidence indicates
that those who watched a sad video tended to show less risk-taking behavior in the context of
hypothetical financial and life dilemma scenarios compared to those who watched a neutral
video (Chou et al., 2007; Treffers et al., 2012). There is no research to date exploring how
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induced emotions influence risky decision making across multiple decision domains (e.g.,
medical, financial) within the same study. This is an important area for future work to address in
order to further understand potential domain differences in risk taking.
Because research on the induction of discrete emotions and risk taking is still in its infancy, it
is unclear why the sad video induction did not have an effect on risky medical decision making.
Although the sad video in the present study was pilot tested and found to be effective at inducing
sadness, this is the first study to use this video to test the effect of sadness on risky decision
making. Future research should aim to utilize other videos and different induction techniques to
further explore the effect of sadness on risky medical decision making.
Since there was no significant effect of the sad video condition on decision making, an
exploratory analysis was conducted with baseline sadness used as an alternative indicator in the
conceptual model. Findings showed that higher levels of sadness at baseline were associated with
greater risky medical decision making. This finding is surprising and opposite of what would be
expected. To my knowledge, this is the first study to explore the effect of sadness on risky
decisions in the medical domain, and hypotheses were mainly based on risky decisions in the
financial domain. Financial decisions typically involve money, which is replaceable and can be
earned back. The riskier options for medical treatments in the current study involved the
potential consequences of worse quality of life or dying. Because life or better health cannot be
regained, these inherent domain differences may explain this differential pattern of findings.
As noted above, more work is necessary to understand how induced emotions affect risk taking
in different decision domains. Potentially, the effect of sadness on risky decision making may
vary across domains, and thus, operate differently within the domain of medical decisions. It is
important to note that exploring the relation between baseline sadness and risky decision making
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was exploratory, and thus, may be a spurious correlation such that the association is due to a
third variable (Simon, 1954).
Theoretical work posits that sadness is characterized by high appraisals of uncertainty and
situational control when faced with a negative event (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985). Yet, there is limited empirical work testing this assumption. The present study
found that those who watched the sad video did not significantly differ in appraisals of
uncertainty or situational control relative to those who watched the neural video. However,
baseline sadness was related to higher appraisals of situational control but not related to
appraisals of uncertainty. These findings provide partial empirical support of a link between
sadness and appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Because
appraisal tendencies, which are specific to certain emotions, are proposed to influence
subsequent decision making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), it then follows that high appraisals of
uncertainty and situational control should explain the link between sadness and risky decision
making. However, this proposition has not yet been empirically tested in the literature. In the
present study, a mediation analysis showed that the appraisal tendencies did not account for the
association between baseline sadness and greater risk taking. Therefore, it is unclear why sadness
at baseline was linked to greater risky decision making, as well as why this association was in the
opposite direction than predicted.
It is important to note that all negative emotions at baseline were significantly associated
with greater risky decision making (see Table 7), which is inconsistent with the predictions of the
appraisal tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001). According to the appraisal
tendency framework, two emotions of the same valence may give rise to distinctive cognitive
and motivational processes, ultimately leading to different decision making. Thus, baseline
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negative emotions in the present study do not appear to be operating as expected since each
negative emotion was similarly related to decision making. However, it’s important to note that
empirical work that supports the appraisal tendency framework (e.g., Lerner et al., 2001; Lerner
et al., 2013) generally involves comparing negative emotions that are experimentally induced,
whereas the current findings on baseline affect are not induced emotions but rather real-life
emotional experiences which may account for the inconsistency.
While the associations between negative emotions and risky decision making in the current
study are inconsistent with the predictions of the appraisal tendency framework which focuses on
discrete emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), the findings also contrast predictions made based on
theories of broad negative affect. According to theories focused on the relation between broad
negative affect and risk taking, it would be predicted that greater negative affect is related to less
risky medical decision making. For example, the affect infusion model argues that negative
affect causes a person to view the world as a threat, and thus, should consequently cause less
risky decision making (Forgas, 1994; 1995). Similarly, the affect heuristic suggests that an
individual should be less risk taking because negative affect should cause greater perceived risks
associated with a decision (Slovic et al., 2005). Yet, findings in the present study are inconsistent
with the predictions derived from these theories and show that broad negative affect at baseline
was related to greater risky medical decision making. Moreover, greater negative affect at
baseline was related to perceiving Treatments B (higher risk option) as less risky than
Treatments A (lower risk option), and these perceived risks statically reduced the association
between negative affect and risky decision making (see Appendix O). Thus, because those in a
greater negative mood at baseline perceived the higher risk options (Treatment B) to involve less
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risks than the lower risk options (Treatment A), the present data are inconsistent with these
theories.
In contrast to the predictions from the affect infusion model and affect heuristic that negative
affect is associated with less risky decisions, the mood-maintenance hypothesis posits that people
experiencing high levels of negative affect want to mitigate their negative mood and in order to
do so, these people will engage in more risk taking as a means of obtaining greater potential
gains (Isen & Patrick, 1983). In the current study, greater negative affect at baseline was related
to perceiving Treatments B (higher risk option) as more beneficial than Treatments A (lower risk
option), and these perceived benefits statically reduced for the association between negative
affect and risky decision making (see Appendix O). Thus, because those in a greater negative
mood at baseline perceived the higher risk options (Treatment B) to involve the chance to obtain
greater benefits than the lower risk options (Treatment A), the present data lend initial support to
the mood-maintenance hypothesis.
Only three studies have explored age differences in risky medical decision making and all
three studies utilized the medical subscale of the DOSPERT (Butler et al., 2012; Hanoch et al.,
2018; Rosman et al., 2013). The medical subscale of the DOSPERT does not assess risky
decisions that a patient with a critical condition would face (Hanoch et al., 2013), whereas the
scenarios used in the current study more accurately capture the diagnosis and treatment of a
serious medical condition or injury. Although initial evidence using the medical DOSPEERT
suggests that there may not be age differences in the medical domain, the current study showed
that older adults made less risky medical decisions than younger adults, which contrasts prior
work. This suggests that the type of medical decisions assessed may matter when trying to
understand age differences in this domain. However, the current study then expanded upon prior
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research by accounting for age differences in baseline negative affect, and found that age was no
longer significantly related to risky decision making. This suggests that age differences in
baseline negative affect statistically accounted for why older adults made less risky decisions
than younger adults.
At baseline, younger adults reported higher levels of negative affect and lower levels of
positive affect than older adults, which is consistent with prior research on age differences in
emotional experiences (Carstensen et al., 2000; Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2004). Researchers
have shown that age differences in risk taking varies across domains (Bonem et al., 2015;
Rolison et al., 2014). However, less work has investigated whether age differences in emotional
experiences account for the link between older age and less risk taking. For example, while
research demonstrates that older adults tend to make less risky health/safety, financial,
recreational, and ethnical decisions than younger adults (e.g., Bonem et al., 2015; Rolison et al.,
2014; Rosman et al., 2013; Shook et al., 2019), these findings have not accounted for age
differences in affect. Findings from the current study emphasize the importance of examining
how age-related emotional experiences are related to, and may account for, age differences in
risk taking.
One previous study demonstrated that after a sad video induction, older adults were less risk
taking than younger adults, which provided initial evidence that age might moderate the
association between sadness and risky decision making (Chou et al., 2007). The present study
did not find a significant interaction between age and the sad video condition, nor between age
and baseline sadness, on risky medical decision making. Because there is a scarcity of empirical
work in this area and Chou et al. (2007) used a different video to induce sadness, these findings
are difficult to interpret. However, Chou et al. (2007) found that the sad induction was stronger
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for older adults relative to younger adults, which they noted may explain their pattern of
findings. The sad video in the present study was pilot tested and there was no evidence of age
differences in self-reported sadness following the induction, which is a strength of this study.
More work is necessary to explore the relation between age, sadness, and risky decision making,
and it is important for future research to utilize inductions that are equally effective among
younger and older adults.
The discrete emotions approach to aging discusses how older age is related to an increased
experience of losses and declines across life domains, which are thought to be related to a
decline in personal control (Kunzmann et al., 2014). Thus, this theory suggests that older adults
should report higher appraisals of situational control than younger adults. However, findings
showed that younger adults reported higher appraisals of situation control than older adults,
which is opposite of what was expected. Additionally, the present study tested the interaction
between age and the sad video condition on situational control and showed that among older
adults, those who watched the sad video reported higher appraisals of situational control than
those who watched the neutral video. This finding highlights the importance of sadness, such that
that older adults who experienced sadness also reported higher appraisals of situation control or a
sense that outcomes are based on factors beyond individual control. Nonetheless, the interaction
between age and baseline sadness on situational control was not significant. Given the scarcity in
empirical work focusing on appraisal dimensions, future researchers should continue to explore
the influence of appraisals dimensions, as well as other characteristics of sadness, such as core
relational components (i.e., loss and helplessness; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). It is also unclear why
induced sadness and baseline sadness appear to be operating differently. Because baseline
sadness was based on a participants’ real-life emotion and induced sadness was based on the
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fictional situation of someone else, this may explain the differential patterns between the two
indicators of sadness.
Altogether, the findings of the present study should be considered within the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, as data were collected during February 2021. The context of the pandemic
may have influenced participants’ risky medical decisions because these medical treatments
involved being in a public place (e.g., doctor’s office/hospital setting) which posed its own risk
of catching COVID-19. The pandemic has been a time of heightened distress (Xiong et al., 2020)
and research has shown that distress (e.g., stress, depression, anxiety) has increased from prepandemic to during the pandemic (Daly et al., 2020; Pierce et al., 2020). However, it’s important
to note that even during the pandemic, well-documented age differences in emotional
experiences have been maintained, such that older adults have reported lower levels of anxiety
and depression relative to younger adults (Bruine de Bruine, 2020; Wilson et al., 2020), which is
consistent with research conducted pre-pandemic (see Charles & Carstensen, 2010, for a review).
Additionally, younger adults in the present study reported higher appraisals of situational control
than older adults. Potentially, this may reflect the context of the pandemic, such that younger
adults are experiencing a heightened sense of loss of control over aspects of their lives (Stewart
& Healy, 1989).
Limitations and Future Directions
The present research has strengths and limitations that provide a foundation for future
research. First, it’s important to note that although the manipulation of the riskiness of the
treatments was successful, participants’ scores on risky decision making tended to be skewed
towards the lower risk option (Treatment A) relative to the higher risk option (Treatment B) .
Further, participants perceived Treatment A (lower risk option) to be more beneficial than
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Treatment B (higher risk option) for two of the medical scenarios. Thus, participants, regardless
of age group and video condition, may have trended toward choosing the less risky option
because they perceived it to be both less risky and more beneficial than the high risk option.
Indeed, work suggests that risks and benefits tend to be inversely related, which is why
individuals who perceive an option as involving high risk also perceive that option as less
beneficial (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994). However, there are situations in which risks and benefits
are positively correlated, such that the option involving high risk also has high benefits. To
further understand risky medical decision making, future work should utilize a measure where
the riskier option is also more beneficial than the less risky option. Additionally, it’s unclear
what the benefits were that participants perceived. For example, did participants perceive
Treatment A (lower risk) to be more beneficial because it was less risky, because of the
likelihood of being ‘cured’, because it made them more confident in their decision, or another
reason? More research is necessary to understand how perceived benefits affect risky decision
making, and what exactly these benefits are that participants perceive.
Second, the data in the present study are cross-sectional and cannot address cohort effects
(Schaie, 1983). More research investigating the effects of context and cohort on risky medical
decision making across adulthood is necessary, such as the implementation of cohort sequential
designs to tease out the effects of historical cohort and changes in decision making with age
(Schaie & Batles, 1975). Third, the data are self-report and may not accurately map onto realworld risk behaviors. Although using hypothetical decision scenarios has shown to predict realworld behaviors (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007), using hypothetical scenarios limits the ecological
validity of the risk-taking task. For example, given the hypothetical nature of the decisions,
participants’ induced emotions may not mimic the real-life emotional experiences that are
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associated with risky medical decision making. Further, only three medical conditions (i.e.,
stroke, cancer, ankle fracture) were assessed in the present study and may not generalize to other
medical conditions. Future research should explore additional, common medical conditions (e.g.,
heart disease, Alzheimer’s disease; CDC, 2020).
Fourth, the use of online crowdsourcing cites for data collection introduces problems related
to users completing the survey more than once, workers creating bots, and inattentive
participants (Goodman et al., 2013; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). However, the present study
utilized the pro features of CloudResearch to block duplicate IP addresses and geolocations from
taking the survey, as well as employed three attention checks throughout the survey to screen for
inattentive participants. Nonetheless, future work should use other sampling methods. Fifth, the
video induction was brief (i.e., 2 minutes) and may not have been intense enough, which may
explain why there was not an effect of the sad video condition on risky decision making.
However, it is important to note that the sad video was piloted tested and was shown to be
effective at inducing sadness. Moreover, the pilot study demonstrated comparable levels of
induced sadness between younger and older adults. Nevertheless, future work should use other
mood induction techniques (e.g., autobiographical recall), which may have stronger, longerlasting effects.
Conclusion
The present study’s findings provide evidence that age differences in risky medical
decisions may be dependent upon the type of medical decisions assessed and age-related
emotional experiences. Additionally, the findings suggest that a sad induction may not have the
same effect on risky medical decisions relative to other risky decisions (e.g., financial). The
potential consequences of the medical decisions in the present study involved worse quality of
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life or death, which are irrevocable and may explain why decision making in the medical domain
operates differently than other decision domains. Future research should utilize this assessment
of risky medical decision making to continue to explore decision making within this domain.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

39

References
Agarwal, S., Driscoll, J. C., Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2009). The age of reason: Financial
decisions over the life cycle and implications for regulation. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 2009(2), 51-117. https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/2009b_bpea_agarwal.pdf
Bodenhausen, G. V. (1993). Emotions, arousal, and stereotypic judgments: A heuristic model of
affect and stereotyping. In Affect, cognition and stereotyping (pp. 13-37). Academic
Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-088579-7.50006-5
Bonem, E. M., Ellsworth, P. C., & Gonzalez, R. (2015). Age differences in risk: Perceptions,
intentions and domains. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(4), 317-330.
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1848
Blais, A. R., & Weber, E. U. (2006). A domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) scale for adult
populations. Judgment and Decision making, 1(1).
Bookwala, J., Coppola, K. M., Fagerlin, A., Ditto, P. H., Danks, J. H., Smucker, W. D. (2001).
Gender differences in older adults’ preferences for life-sustaining medical treatments and
end-of-life values. Death studies, 25(2), 127-149.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07481180126202
Botti, S., & Iyengar, S. S. (2006). The dark side of choice: When choice impairs social
welfare. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1), 24-38.
https://doi.org/10.1509/jppm.25.1.24
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2016). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source
of inexpensive, yet high-quality data? In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Methodological issues and

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

40

strategies in clinical research (p. 133–139). American Psychological
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/14805-009
Butler, S., Rosman, A., Seleski, S., Garcia, M., Lee, S., Barnes, J., & Schwartz, A. (2012). A
medical risk attitude subscale for DOSPERT. Judgment & Decision Making, 7(2), 189195.
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2007). Individual differences in adult
decision-making competence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(5), 938 –
956. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.938.
Bruine de Bruin, W., McNair, S. J., Taylor, A. L., Summers, B., & Strough, J. (2015). “Thinking
about numbers is not my idea of fun” Need for cognition mediates age differences in
numeracy performance. Medical Decision Making, 35(1), 22-26.
Carpenter, S. M., & Niedenthal, P. M. (2018). Emotional processes in risky and multiattribute
health decisions. Psychology & Health, 33(1), 58-76.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2017.1314478
Carstensen, L. L., Pasupathi, M., Mayr, U., & Nesselroade, J. R. (2000). Emotional experience in
everyday life across the adult life span. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 79(4), 644-655. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.4.644
Carstensen, L. L., Fung, H. H., & Charles, S. T. (2003). Socioemotional selectivity theory and
the regulation of emotion in the second half of life. Motivation and Emotion, 27(2), 103123. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024569803230
Carstensen, L. L. (2006). The influence of a sense of time on human development.
Science, 312(5782), 1913-1915. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1127488

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

41

Carstensen, L. L., Shavit, Y. Z., & Barnes, J. T. (2020). Age advantages in emotional experience
persist even under threat from the COVID-19 pandemic. Psychological Science,
0956797620967261.
Charles, S. T. (2010). Strength and vulnerability integration: a model of emotional well-being
across adulthood. Psychological Bulletin, 136(6), 1068. https://doi.org10.1037/a0021232
Chou, K. L., Lee, T., & Ho, A. H. (2007). Does mood state change risk taking tendency in older
adults? Psychology and Aging, 22(2), 310-318. https://doi.org/10.1037/08827974.22.2.310
Cryder, C. E., Lerner, J. S., Gross, J. J., & Dahl, R. E. (2008). Misery is not miserly: Sad and
self-focused individuals spend more. Psychological Science, 19(6), 525-530.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02118.x
Derry, H. M., Epstein, A. S., Lichtenthal, W. G., & Prigerson, H. G. (2019). Emotions in the
room: Common emotional reactions to discussions of poor prognosis and tools to address
them. Expert Review of Anticancer Therapy, 19(8), 689-696.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14737140.2019.1651648
DeSteno, D., Gross, J. J., & Kubzansky, L. (2013). Affective science and health: The importance
of emotion and emotion regulation. Health Psychology, 32(5), 474-486.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030259
DeSteno, D., Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & Rucker, D. D. (2000). Beyond valence in the
perception of likelihood: The role of emotion specificity. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 78(3), 397-416. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.3.397
Edlund, B., & Sneed, N. V. (1989). Emotional responses to the diagnosis of cancer: Age-related
comparisons. In Oncology Nursing Forum, 16(5), 691-697.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

42

Ellis, E. M., Klein, W. M., Orehek, E., & Ferrer, R. A. (2018). Effects of emotion on medical
decisions involving tradeoffs. Medical Decision Making, 38(8), 1027-1039.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X18806493
Erdfelder, E., Faul, F., & Buchner, A. (1996). GPOWER: A general power analysis
program. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 28(1), 1-11.
Fajula, C., Bonin-Guillaume, S., Jouve, E., & Blin, O. (2013). Emotional reactivity assessment
of healthy elderly with an emotion-induction procedure. Experimental Aging
Research, 39(1), 109-124. https://doi.org/10.1080/0361073X.2013.741961
Fernández-Aguilar, L., Ricarte, J., Ros, L., & Latorre, J. M. (2018). Emotional differences in
young and older adults: Films as mood induction procedure. Frontiers in Psychology, 9,
1110.
Ferrer, R., Klein, W., Lerner, J. S., Reyna, V. F., & Keltner, D. (2016). Emotions and Health
Decision-Making: Extending the Appraisal Tendency Framework to Improve Health and
Healthcare. In C. Roberto & I. Kawachi (Eds.), Behavioral economics and public health.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ferrer, R. A., & Mendes, W. B. (2018). Emotion, health decision making, and health behaviour.
Psychology & Health, 33(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2017.1385787
Ferrer, R. A., & Ellis, E. M. (2019). Moving beyond categorization to understand affective
influences on real world health decisions. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass, 13(11), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12502
Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Pimley, S., & Novacek, J. (1987). Age differences in stress and
coping processes. Psychology and Aging, 2(2), 171-184. https://doi.org/10.1037/08827974.2.2.171

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

43

Forgas, J. P. (1994). The role of emotion in social judgments: An introductory review and an
Affect Infusion Model (AIM). European Journal of Social Psychology, 24(1), 1-24.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420240102
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: the affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological
Bulletin, 117(1), 39- 66. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.39.
Gilman, T. L., Shaheen, R., Nylocks, K. M., Halachoff, D., Chapman, J., Flynn, J. J., ... &
Coifman, K. G. (2017). A film set for the elicitation of emotion in research: A
comprehensive catalog derived from four decades of investigation. Behavior Research
Methods, 49(6), 2061-2082.
Goodman, J. K., Cryder, C. E., & Cheema, A. (2013). Data collection in a flat world: The
strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 26(3), 213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1753
Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1995). Emotion elicitation using films. Cognition &
Emotion, 9(1), 87-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699939508408966
Grühn, D., Sharifian, N., & Chu, Q. (2016). The limits of a limited future time perspective in
explaining age differences in emotional functioning. Psychology and Aging, 31(6), 583593. https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000060
Hanoch, Y., Rolison, J. J., & Freund, A. M. (2018). Does medical risk perception and risk taking
change with age? Risk Analysis, 38(5), 917-928. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12692
Hazer, D., Ma, X., Rukavina, S., Gruss, S., Walter, S., & Traue, H. C. (2015). Emotion
elicitation using film clips: Effect of age groups on movie choice and emotion rating. In
C. Stephanidis (Ed.), HCI International 2015 - Posters’ Extended Abstracts:
International Conference, HCI International 2015, Los Angeles, CA, USA, August 2-7,

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

44

2015. Proceedings, Part I (pp. 110–116). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21380-4_20
Hess, T. M., Strough, J., & Löckenhoff, C. (Eds.). (2015). Aging and decision making: Empirical
and applied perspectives. Elsevier Academic Press.
Hewig, J., Hagemann, D., Seifert, J., Gollwitzer, M., Naumann, E., & Bartussek, D. (2005). A
revised film set for the induction of basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 19(7), 10951109.
Hong, H. (2009). Scale development for measuring health consciousness: Reconceptualization. that Matters to the Practice, 212-234.
Isen, A. M., & Patrick, R. (1983). The effect of positive feelings on risk taking: When the chips
are down. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 31(2), 194-202.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(83)90120-4
Jefferies, L. N., Smilek, D., Eich, E., & Enns, J. T. (2008). Emotional valence and arousal
interact in attentional control. Psychological Science, 19(3), 290-295.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02082.x
Jenkins, L. M., & Andrewes, D. G. (2012). A new set of standardized verbal and non-verbal
contemporary film stimuli for the elicitation of emotions. Brain Impairment, 13(2), 212227.
Josef, A. K., Richter, D., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Wagner, G. G., Hertwig, R., & Mata, R.
(2016). Stability and change in risk-taking propensity across the adult life span. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 111(3), 430-450.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000090

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

45

Jung, H., & Young, M. J. (2012). The de‐biasing effect of incidental anger on other‐provided
anchors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(5), 435-442.
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.739
Kring, A. M., & Gordon, A. H. (1998). Sex differences in emotion: expression, experience, and
physiology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(3), 686-703.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.686
Kunzmann, U., & Grühn, D. (2005). Age differences in emotional reactivity: The sample case of
sadness. Psychology and Aging, 20(1), 47-59. https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.20.1.47
Kunzmann, U., Kappes, C., & Wrosch, C. (2014). Emotional aging: a discrete emotions
perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 380. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00380
Lawton, M. P., Moss, M., Fulcomer, M., & Kleban, M. H. (1982). A research and service
oriented multilevel assessment instrument. Journal of Gerontology, 37(1), 91-99.
https://doi.org/10.1093/geronj/37.1.91
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific
influences on judgement and choice. Cognition & Emotion, 14(4), 473-493.
https://doi.org/10.1080/026999300402763
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81(1), 146-159. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.81.1.146
Lerner, J. S., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Portrait of the angry decision maker: How appraisal
tendencies shape anger's influence on cognition. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 19(2), 115-137. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.515
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., & Weber, E. U. (2013). The financial costs of sadness. Psychological
Science, 24(1), 72-79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612450302

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

46

Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision
making. Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 799-823. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevpsych-010213-115043
Levenson, R. W. (1992). Autonomic nervous system differences among emotions. Psychological
Science, 3(1), 23-27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00251.x
Leventhal, H., Herold, J., Leventhal, E. A., Burns, E., & Diefenbach, M. A. (2015). Decisions
and actions for life patterns and health practices as we age: A bottom-up approach. In T.
M. Hess, J. Strough, & C. E. Löckenhoff (Eds.), Aging and decision making: Empirical
and applied perspectives (p. 283–308). Elsevier Academic Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-417148-0.00014-5
Lindenberger, U., & Baltes, P. B. (1997). Intellectual functioning in old and very old age: Crosssectional results from the Berlin Aging Study. Psychology and Aging, 12(3), 410 –432.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.12.3.410.
Löckenhoff, C. E., & Carstensen, L. L. (2004). Socioemotional selectivity theory, aging, and
health: The increasingly delicate balance between regulating emotions and making tough
choices. Journal of Personality, 72(6), 1395-1424. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14676494.2004.00301.x
Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). The role of affect in decision making. In R. J. Davidson,
K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Series in affective science. Handbook of
affective sciences (pp. 619–642). Oxford University Press.
Loewenstein, G. (2005). Hot-cold empathy gaps and medical decision making. Health
Psychology, 24(4S), S49-S56. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.S49

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

47

Mamerow, L., Frey, R., & Mata, R. (2016). Risk taking across the life span: A comparison of
self-report and behavioral measures of risk taking. Psychology and Aging, 31(7), 711723. https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000124
Mata, R., Josef, A. K., & Hertwig, R. (2016). Propensity for risk taking across the life span and
around the globe. Psychological Science, 27(2), 231-243.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615617811
Mata, R., Frey, R., Richter, D., Schupp, J., & Hertwig, R. (2018). Risk preference: A view from
psychology. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(2), 155-172.
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.32.2.155
Mather, M. (2012). The emotion paradox in the aging brain. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1251(1), 33–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2012.06471.x
Mather, M., Mazar, N., Gorlick, M. A., Lighthall, N. R., Burgeno, J., Schoeke, A., & Ariely, D.
(2012). Risk preferences and aging: The “certainty effect” in older adults' decision
making. Psychology and Aging, 27(4), 801-816. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030174
Mikels, J. A., & Reed, A. E. (2009). Monetary losses do not loom large in later life: Age
differences in the framing effect. Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological
Sciences and Social Sciences, 64(4), 457-460. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbp043
Mikels, J. A., Shuster, M. M., & Thai, S. T. (2015). Aging, emotion, and decision making. In T.
M. Hess, J. Strough, & C. E. Löckenhoff (Eds.), Aging and decision making: Empirical
and applied perspectives (pp. 169–188). Elsevier Academic Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-417148-0.00009-1

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

48

Mills, C., & D'Mello, S. (2014). On the validity of the autobiographical emotional memory task
for emotion induction. PloS one, 9(4), e95837.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0095837
Mroczek, D. K., & Kolarz, C. M. (1998). The effect of age on positive and negative affect: A
developmental perspective on happiness. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75(5), 1333-1349. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.75.5.1333
Nesse, R. M. (2000). Is depression an adaptation? Archives of General Psychiatry, 57(1), 14-20.
https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.57.1.14
Palmore, E. B. (1981). Social patterns in normal aging: Findings from the Duke Longitudinal
Study. Duke Univ Press.
Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014). Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a
participant pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(3), 184-188.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414531598
Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. (2017). Beyond the Turk: Alternative
platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 70, 153-163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.01.006
Peters, E., Hibbard, J., Slovic, P., & Dieckmann, N. (2007). Numeracy skill and the
communication, comprehension, and use of risk-benefit information. Health Affairs,
26(3), 741-748. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.26.3.741
Reyna, V. F., Nelson, W. L., Han, P. K., & Dieckmann, N. F. (2009). How numeracy influences
risk comprehension and medical decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 135(6), 943973. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017327.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

49

Rolison, J. J., Hanoch, Y., Wood, S., & Liu, P. J. (2014). Risk-taking differences across the adult
life span: A question of age and domain. Journals of Gerontology Series B:
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 69(6), 870-880.
https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbt081
Rosman, A., Garcia, M., Lee, S., Butler, S., & Schwartz, A. (2013). DOSPERT+ M: A survey of
medical risk attitudes in the United States. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(4), 470481.
Salas, C. E., Radovic, D., & Turnbull, O. H. (2012). Inside-out: comparing internally generated
and externally generated basic emotions. Emotion, 12(3), 568-578.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025811
Salkovskis, P. M., RIMES, K. A., & WARWICK, H. M. C. (2002). The Health Anxiety
Inventory: development and validation of scales for the measurement of health anxiety
and hypochondriasis. Psychological Medicine, 32(5), 843-853. DOI:
10.1017/S0033291702005822
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Gibbs, S. E., Khanna, K., Nielsen, L., Carstensen, L. L., & Knutson, B.
(2007). Anticipation of monetary gain but not loss in healthy older adults. Nature
Neuroscience, 10(6), 787-791. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1894
Schaie, W., & Baltes, P. B. (1975). On sequential strategies in developmental research. Human
Development, 18(5), 384-390.
Schaie, K. W. (Ed.). (1983). Longitudinal studies of adult psychological development. New
York: Guilford press.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

50

Seider, B. H., Shiota, M. N., Whalen, P., & Levenson, R. W. (2011). Greater sadness reactivity
in late life. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6(2), 186-194.
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsq069
Sheehan, K. B. (2018). Crowdsourcing research: Data collection with Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Communication Monographs, 85(1), 140-156.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2017.1342043
Shook, N. J., Ford, C., Strough, J., Delaney, R., & Barker, D. (2017). In the moment and feeling
good: Age differences in mindfulness and positive affect. Translational Issues in
Psychological Science, 3(4), 338-347. https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000139
Shook, N. J., Delaney, R. K., Strough, J., Wilson, J. M., Sevi, B., & Altman, N. (2019). Playing
it safe: Dispositional mindfulness partially accounts for age differences in health and
safety risk-taking propensity. Current Psychology, 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144019-0137-3
Simon, H. A. (1954). Spurious correlation: A causal interpretation. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 49(267), 467-479.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1954.10483515
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005). Affect, risk, and decision
making. Health Psychology, 24(4S), S35- S40. https://doi.org/10.1037/02786133.24.4.S35.
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 48(4), 813-838.
Stone, R., & Harahan, M. F. (2010). Improving the long-term care workforce serving older
adults. Health Affairs, 29(1), 109-115. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0554

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

51

Strough, J., Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., Lemaster, P., Pichayayothin, N., & Delaney, R.
(2016). Hour glass half full or half empty? Future time perspective and preoccupation
with negative events across the life span. Psychology and Aging, 31(6), 558-573.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000097
Strough J., Wilson J., Bruine de Bruin W. (2020). Aging and Financial Decision Making. In
Zaleskiewicz T., Traczyk J. (Eds.) Psychological Perspectives on Financial Decision
Making. (pp. 167-186). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-455002_8
Szasz, P. L., Hofmann, S. G., Heilman, R. M., & Curtiss, J. (2016). Effect of regulating anger
and sadness on decision-making. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 45(6), 479-495.
https://doi.org/10.1080/16506073.2016.1203354
Thomas, K. A., & Clifford, S. (2017). Validity and Mechanical Turk: An assessment of
exclusion methods and interactive experiments. Computers in Human Behavior, 77, 184197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.08.038
Treffers, T., Koellinger, P., & Picot, A. O. (2012). In the mood for risk? A random-assignment
experiment addressing the effects of moods on risk preferences. ERIM Report Series
Reference No. ERS-2012-014-ORG.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures
of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070.
Weber, E. U., Blais, A. R., & Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain‐specific risk‐attitude scale:
Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 15(4), 263-290. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.414

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

52

Weigold, A., Weigold, I. K., & Russell, E. J. (2013). Examination of the equivalence of selfreport survey-based paper-and-pencil and internet data collection methods. Psychological
Methods, 18(1), 53-70. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031607
Wilson, J. M., Lee, J., Fitzgerald, H. N., Oosterhoff, B., Sevi, B., & Shook, N. J. (2020). Job
insecurity and financial concern during the COVID-19 pandemic are associated with
worse mental health. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 62(9), 686691. doi: 10.1097/JOM.0000000000001962
Wrosch, C., & Miller, G. E. (2009). Depressive symptoms can be useful: Self-regulatory and
emotional benefits of dysphoric mood in adolescence. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 96(6), 1181-1190. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015172
Wrosch, C., Barlow, M. A., & Kunzmann, U. (2018). Age-related changes in older adults’ anger
and sadness: The role of perceived control. Psychology and Aging, 33(2), 350–360.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000229
Zikmund-Fisher, B. J., Couper, M. P., Singer, E., Levin, C. A., Fowler Jr, F. J., Ziniel, S., ... &
Fagerlin, A. (2010). The Decisions study: A nationwide survey of United States adults
regarding 9 common medical decisions. Medical Decision Making, 30(5_suppl), 20-34.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X09353792
Zillman, D., & Bryant, J. (1984). Affect, Moods and Emotion as Determinants of Selective
Exposure. Selective exposure to communication. Hillsdale, NJ, 157-190.

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

53

Table 1
Demographic Characteristics for Each Age Group
Younger Adults

Older Adults

Measure

M (n)

SD (%)

M (n)

SD (%)

Group Comparison

Age
Sex
Female
Male
Other
Race/Ethnicity
White
African American
Asian
Native American
Hispanic
Not reported
Marital Status
Single
Relationship, not married
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Income
> $20,000
$20,000-$39,000
$40,000-$59,000
$60,000-$79,000
$80,000-$99,000
>$100,000
Education
Did not receive high school diploma
Vocational training
High school diploma or GED
Some college
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
Some graduate work but no degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree or PhD
Other
Employment
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Not employed, looking for work
Not employed, not looking for work
Retired
Other
Work in medical field
No
Yes
Missing
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

28.91

3.88

66.92

5.63

t(268) = -63.95***
x²(2) = 5.12

43.8%
53.1%
3.1%

71
71
-

50%
50%
-

56
68
4

χ2(5) = 27.22***
81
17
12
3
14
1

63.3%
13.3%
9.4%
2.3%
10.9%
0.8%

127
5
3
2
4
1

89.4
3.5
2.1
1.4
2.8
0.7
χ2(5) = 84.33***

66
15
47
-

51.6%
11.7%
36.7%
-

14
10
74
1
28
15

9.9%
7.0%
52.1%
0.7%
19.7%
10.6%
χ2(7) = 4.97

12
31
33
21
15
16

9.4%
24.2%
25.8%
16.4%
11.7%
12.5%

17
37
36
19
12
21

12.0%
26.1%
25.4%
13.4%
8.5%
14.7%
χ2(9) = 19.63*

1
6
12
21
6
61
3
17
1
-

0.8%
4.7%
9.4%
16.4%
4.7%
47.7%
2.3%
13.3%
0.8%
-

1
6
11
25
16
38
8
31
5
1

0.7%
4.2%
7.7%
17.6%
11.3%
26.8%
5.6%
21.8%
3.5%
0.7%
χ2(5) = 104.05***

80
20
18
6
4

62.5%
15.6%
14.1%
4.7%
3.1%

37
22
2
6
74
1

26.1%
15.5%
1.4%
4.2%
52.1%
0.7%
χ2(1) = 0.22

115
13
-

89.8%
10.2%
-

129
12
1

90.8%
8.5%
0.7%
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Key Study Variables by Age Group and Video Condition
Age Group

Video Condition
Neutral
Condition
Sad Condition
(n = 137)
(n = 133)

Younger Adult
(n = 128)

Older Adult
(n = 142)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

Risky decision
making

2.95(1.45)a

2.51(1.25)b

2.66(1.36)a

2.78(1.37)a

2.72(1.36)

Uncertainty

5.67(1.56)a

5.84(1.39)a

5.63(1.74)a

5.90(1.60)a

5.76(1.77)

Situational control

4.19(1.24)a

3.23(1.39)b

3.53(1.41)a

3.84(1.38)a

3.68(1.40)

Negative affect

1.75(0.84)a

1.20(0.52)b

1.46(0.68)a

1.47(0.65)a

1.46(0.74)

Positive affect

2.99(0.93)a

3.21(0.78)b

2.93(0.62)a

2.85(0.61)a

3.11(0.86)

Baseline sadness

1.84(0.99)a

1.34(0.67)b

1.54(0.82)a

1.61(0.92)a

1.57(0.87)

Current health

3.05(0.71)a

2.97(0.68)a

3.01(0.69)a

3.00(0.71)a

3.01(0.70)

Health consciousness

5.14(0.87)a

5.22(0.75)a

5.19(0.74)a

5.17(0.87)a

5.18(0.81)

Health anxiety

1.11(0.64)a

0.83(0.57)b

0.95(0.62)a

0.97(0.62)a

0.96(0.62)

Social support

5.19(1.32)a

5.54(1.19)b

5.41(1.23)a

5.35(1.30)a

5.38(1.26)

Self-illness

0.19(0.47)a

0.32(0.56)b

0.23(0.49)a

0.28(0.56)a

0.26(0.52)

Other-illness

1.55(1.18)a

2.08(0.90)b

1.88(1.05)a

1.78(1.11)a

1.83(1.08)

Self-treatment

0.68(1.53)a

0.62(1.09)a

0.61(1.33)a

0.69(1.31)a

0.65(1.32)

Other-treatment

3.53(1.61)a

3.49(1.43)a

3.50(1.43)a

3.51(1.58)a

3.51(1.50)

Perceived risks

2.66(2.38)a

3.80(2.31)b

3.12(2.44)a

3.41(2.38)a

3.26(2.42)

Variable

Total
(n = 270)

Perceived benefits
-0.10(1.96)a
-0.96(2.60)b
-0.40(2.55)a
-0.71(2.13)a
-0.55(2.35)
Note. Means with different subscripts under the column of Age Group indicates significant differences
between younger and older adults (p < .05). Means with different subscripts under the column of Video
Condition indicates significant differences between the neutral and sad condition (p < .05). Higher, positive
scores for perceived risks indicates perceiving Treatment B (higher risk option) as more risky than Treatment
A (lower risk option). Higher, positive scores for benefits indicates perceiving Treatment B (higher risk
option) as more beneficial than Treatment A (lower risk option).
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Table 3
Paired Samples t-tests for Risks and Benefits of Treatment Options
Decision Scenario

Treatment A
M(SD)

Treatment B
M(SD)

Group Comparison

Stroke

0.90(1.20)

3.03(0.88)

t(269) = -22.83***

Cancer

2.32(1.09)

3.07(0.81)

t(269) = -11.02***

Ankle Fracture

0.91(1.03)

2.24(1.00)

t(269) = -19.27***

Stroke

3.01(0.90)

2.57(0.95)

t(269) = 5.79***

Cancer

2.63(0.87)

2.71(0.90)

t(268) = -1.48

Perceived Risks

Perceived Benefits

Ankle Fracture
3.07(0.82)
2.86(0.85)
t(269) = 3.58***
Note. High scores for perceived risks indicates perceiving Treatment B (higher risk
option) as more risky than Treatment A (lower risk option). Higher scores for benefits
indicates perceiving Treatment B (higher risk option) as more beneficial than Treatment A
(lower risk option). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Table 4
Bivariate Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Key Study Variables
1
1. Age group

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

-

2. Video condition

-.09

-

3. Risky decision making

-.16**

.05

-

4. Uncertainty

.05

.08

.23***

5. Situational control

-.34***

.11

.21**

.25***

6. Negative affect

-.37***

-.00

.30***

.12*

.33***

-

7. Positive affect

.13*

-.08

.00

-.10

-.18**

.04

8. Baseline sadness

-.29***

.04

.25***

.08

.33***

.78***

-.08

9. Current health

-.05

-.01

.07

-.07

.04

.01

.22**

-.05

-

10. Health consciousness

.05

-.01

-.04

-.04

.12

-.09

.27***

-.02

.10

-

11. Health anxiety

-.22***

.02

.13*

.03

.22***

.31***

-.15*

.31***

-.14*

.06

-

12. Social support

.14*

-.02

-.21***

-.09

-.15*

-.24***

.26***

-.35***

.14*

-.27***

13. Self-illness

.12*

.04

.05

.003

-.04

.07

.10

.02

-.11

.07

-.01

.10

-

14. Other- illness

.25***

-.04

-.08

.10

-.07

-.01

.11

-.001

.04

.15*

-.07

.13*

.23***

-

15. Self-treatment

-.02

.03

.07

.01

-.06

.11

.05

.04

-.02

-.01

-.04

.05

.53***

.15*

16. Other- treatment

-.01

.003

.04

.11

.06

.08

.24***

.04

.03

.14*

-.08

.14*

.25*

.64***

.25***

17. Perceived risks

.24***

.06

.21***

.01

-.13**

-.20**

-.05

-.10

-.14*

.12

.03

-.04

.000

.12

-.12

18. Perceived benefits

-.18**

-.07

.39***

.07

.11

.14*

-.14*

.18**

-.06

-.08

.14*

-.06

-.03

-.07

.07

-

-

.20**

-

-

Note. Age (0 = younger adult, 1 = older adult), video condition (0 = neutral, 1 = sad). Higher scores for perceived risks indicates perceiving
Treatment B (higher risk option) as more risky than Treatment A (lower risk option). Higher scores for benefits indicates perceiving Treatment B
(higher risk option) as more beneficial than Treatment A (lower risk option). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

-.12
-.08

.11
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Table 5
Risky Medical Decision Making and Demographic Characteristics
Risky Decision Making
Demographics

M(SD)

Correlation

Sex
Male
2.83(1.37)a
Female
2.61(1.36)a
Race/ethnicity
White
2.62(1.31)a
Not-white
3.04(1.50)b
Marital Status
In relationship/married
2.66(1.39)a
Not in relationship/married
2.79(1.34)a
Employment
Employed full-time
2.93(1.48)a
Not employed full-time
2.56(1.24)b
Work in medical field
Yes
3.16(1.61)a
No
2.67(1.32)a
Education
-.04
Income
.11
Note. Means with different subscripts for each demographic characteristic
indicates significant differences (p < .05).
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Table 6
Analysis of Covariance Summary for Age and Video Main Effects and Interaction on Risky Medical Decision Making,
Controlling for Baseline Affect
Predictor
SS
df
MS
F
p
ηp2
Age group

0.31

1

0.31

0.31

.67

.001

Video condition

1.13

1

1.13

0.68

.41

.003

Age x Video

1.25

1

1.25

0.76

.38

.003

Negative affect

26.83

1

26.83

16.29

<.001

.06

Positive affect

0.22

1

0.22

0.13

.72

.001

Health anxiety

0.08

1

0.08

0.05

.83

.00

Social support

10.03

1

10.03

6.09

.01

.02

Race

4.99

1

4.99

3.03

.08

.01

Employment
4.87
1
4.87
2.95
.09
.01
Note. Age group (0 = younger adult, 1 = older adult), video condition (0 = neutral, 1 = sad), race (1 = White, 0 = not
White), employment (1 = employed full-time, 0 = not employed full-time).
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Table 7
Bivariate Correlations among Risky Medical Decision Making and Individual Baseline Negative Affect and Sadness Adjectives
11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1. Risky decision making

-

2. Distressed

.26***

-

3. Upset

.31***

.74***

-

4. Scared

.31***

.65***

.72***

-

5. Jittery

.25***

.67***

.69***

.70***

-

6. Irritable

.18***

.69***

.66***

.60***

.55***

-

7. Afraid

.25***

.71***

.71***

.65***

.70***

.54***

-

8. Nervous

.23***

.69***

.60***

.57***

.69***

.66***

.71***

-

9. Sad

.26***

.68***

.66**

.58***

.57***

.61***

.57***

.57***

-

10. Blue

.20***

.64***

.65***

.55***

.59***

.61***

.64***

.61***

.81***

-

11. Unhappy

.24***

.56***

.63***

.50***

.55***

.53***

.59***

.54***

.70***

.75***

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Higher scores for risky decision making indicate greater risk taking.

-
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Figure 1. Conceptual moderated mediation model of the effects of sadness and age on risky medical
decision making. Video condition used as an indicator of sadness.
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Figure 2. Moderation analysis to test the interaction between video condition and age group on
risky medical decision making, while controlling for baseline positive and negative affect.
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Figure 3. Interaction between age group and video condition on appraisals of situational control,
while controlling for positive and negative affect at baseline. Error bars: 95% CI.
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Figure 4. Conceptual moderated mediation model of the effects of sadness and age on risky
medical decision making. Sadness at baseline used as an indicator of sadness.
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Appendix A
Mood
Instructions: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you CURRENTLY feel this way, that is, how you feel RIGHT NOW:
very slightly
or not at all
1

1. Interested
2. Distressed
3. Alert
4. Excited
5. Upset
6. Inspired
7. Strong
8. Nervous
9. Scared
10. Jittery
11. Enthusiastic
12. Irritable
13. Attentive
14. Afraid
15. Sad
16. Blue
17. Unhappy
18. Neutral
19. Indifferent
20. Unemotional

a little

moderately

2

3

quite a bit
4

extremely
5
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Appendix B
Risky Medical Decisions
(Bookawala et al., 2001; Strough et al., in preparation)
On the next screens, we will ask you to predict the medical decision you would make in different
situations. Assume all medical treatments are fully covered by insurance.
SCENARIO 1: Stroke
Imagine that you have suffered a moderately severe stroke. One arm and one leg are paralyzed.
You have trouble speaking and understanding when others speak. You rely on others for help
with feeding, dressing, bathing, and toileting. Your doctor says that without treatment, you have
a very slight chance of improvement. Assume both treatments are fully covered by insurance.
There are two treatment options available:
• Treatment A (Therapy): Treatment A aims to reduce the severity of the symptoms through
speech, physical, and occupational therapy. Your doctor says that there is a good chance
(80%) that the therapy will improve quality of life because it will reduce the severity of your
symptoms. There is a small chance (20%) there will be no change.
• Treatment B (Surgery): Treatment B aims to reduce the severity of the symptoms through
surgery. Your doctor says that if successful, you will be completely cured after the surgery.
However, the surgery is risky. There is a very small chance (5%) that it may be fatal. There is
a 50-50 chance that after the surgery, you will not be cured and things may get worse.
1 (most likely to choose Treatment A – Therapy)
Surgery)

6 (most likely to choose Treatment B –

SCENARIO 2: Cancer
Imagine you have cancer that has spread to the liver. You are tired and weak, needing some help
with household chores. Your thinking and memory are not affected. You are not in pain. Your
doctor says that without treatment, there is no chance of recovery and you would have about six
months to live. Assume both treatments are fully covered by insurance. There are two treatments
available:
• Treatment A (Radiation Therapy): Treatment A aims to reduce the size of tumors through
radiation therapy. Your doctor says that there is a good chance (80%) that the therapy will
improve your quality of life because it will reduce the severity of your symptoms and
increase your chance of living longer than six months. There is a small chance (20%) there
will be no change.
• Treatment B (Surgery): Treatment B aims to remove the tumors through surgery. Your
doctor says that if successful, your quality of life will improve because the surgery will
completely eliminate your symptoms and will increase your chance of living longer than one
year. However, the surgery is risky. There is a very small (5%) chance that it may be fatal.
There is a 50-50 chance that after the surgery you will not be cured and things may get
worse.
1 (most likely to choose Treatment A – Radiation Therapy) 6 (most likely to choose Treatment B
– Surgery)

SADNESS, AGE AND RISKY MEDICAL DECISIONS

66

SCENARIO 3: Ankle Fracture
Imagine that you have been in a car accident and suffered an ankle fracture due to the impact.
You have swelling of the ankle, are in immediate pain, and are unable to walk. Your doctor says
that due to the severity of the fracture, there is no chance of recovery without treatment. Assume
both treatments are fully covered by insurance. There are two treatment options available:
Treatment A (Cast): Treatment A aims to reduce the severity of the symptoms by repositioning
the fractured bone and then immobilizing your ankle in a cast. Your doctor says that there is a
good chance (80%) that the cast will improve quality of life because it will reduce the severity of
your symptoms. There is a small chance (20%) of poor fracture alignment which will cause joint
stiffness and tenderness of the ankle.
Treatment B (Surgery): Treatment B aims to reduce the severity of the symptoms through
surgery. Your doctor says that if successful, the surgical implants (i.e., plates and screws) will
completely eliminate your symptoms. However, the surgery is risky. There is a very small (5%)
chance that the implant will fail and you will need another operation to correct the complications,
which will cause difficulty walking. There is a 50-50 chance that after the surgery you will not
be cured and things may get worse.
1 (most likely to choose Treatment A – Cast) 6 (most likely to choose Treatment B – Surgery)
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Appraisal Tendencies

Uncertainty (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988)
1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely).
1. How well could you predict the effectiveness of the treatment in this situation?
2. How uncertain were you about the effectiveness of the treatment in this situation?

Situational Control
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
3. Whether or not the treatment is effective is mostly a matter of luck
4. The effectiveness of the treatment is greatly influenced by fate
5. The effectiveness of the treatment is beyond any human’s control
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Appendix D
Perception of Medical Risks
(Weber et al., 2002)
For each treatment, please indicate how risky, in general, you think it is from 0 (not at all risky)
to 4 (very risky)
1. Speech, physical, and occupational therapy for a stoke.
2. Surgery for a stroke.
3. Radiation therapy for cancer.
4. Surgery for cancer.
5. Cast for an ankle fracture.
6. Surgery for an ankle fracture.
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Appendix E
Benefits of Medical Risks
(Strough et al., in preparation)
For each treatment, please indicate how much benefit, in general, you think there is to it from 0
(no benefits at all) to 4 (great benefits)
1. Speech, physical, and occupational therapy for a stoke.
2. Surgery for a stroke.
3. Radiation therapy for cancer.
4. Surgery for cancer.
5. Cast for an ankle fracture.
6. Surgery for an ankle fracture.
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Appendix F
Familiarity with Medical Scenarios and Treatments
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Have you ever been diagnosed with having a stroke? (yes/no)
Has someone you know ever been diagnosed with having a stroke? (yes/no)
Have you ever been diagnosed with cancer? (yes/no)
Has someone you know ever been diagnosed with cancer? (yes/no)
Have you ever been diagnosed with an ankle fracture? (yes/no)
Has someone you know ever been diagnosed with an ankle fracture? (yes/no)
Have you ever had speech, physical, or occupational therapy to treat a stroke? (yes/no)
Has someone you know ever had speech, physical, or occupational therapy to treat a stroke?
(yes/no)
9. Have you ever had surgery to treat a stroke? (yes/no)
10. Has someone you know ever had surgery to treat a stroke? (yes/no)
11. Have you ever had radiation therapy to treat cancer? (yes/no)
12. Has someone you know ever had radiation therapy to treat cancer? (yes/no)
13. Have you ever had surgery to treat cancer? (yes/no)
14. Has someone you know ever had surgery to treat cancer? (yes/no)
15. Have you ever had a cast to treat an ankle fracture? (yes/no)
16. Had someone you know ever had a cast to treat an ankle fracture? (yes/no)
17. Have you ever had surgery to treat an ankle fracture? (yes/no)
18. Has someone you know ever had surgery to treat an ankle fracture? (yes/no)
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Appendix G
Perceived Health
(Lawton et al., 1982)
How would you rate your overall health at the present time?
1= excellent

2 = good

3 = fair

4 = poor
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Appendix H
Health Consciousness
(Hong, 2009)
1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree)
1. I’m very self-conscious about my health.
2. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings about my health.
3. I reflect about my health a lot.
4. I’m concerned about my health all the time.
5. I notice how I feel physically as I go through the day.
6. I take responsibility for the state of my health.
7. Good health takes active participation on my part.
8. I only worry about my health when I get sick. (R)
9. Living life without disease and illness is very important to me.
10. My health depends on how well I take care of myself.
11. Living life in the best possible health is very important to me
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Appendix I
Short Health Anxiety Inventory
(Salkovskis et al., 2002)
For the following questions, please think about what it might be like if you had a serious illness
of a type which particularly concerns you (such as heart disease, cancer, multiple sclerosis and so
on). Obviously you cannot know for definite what it would be like ; please give your best
estimate of what you think might happen, basing your estimate on what you know about yourself
and serious illness in general.
1.

(a) If I had a serious illness I would still be able to enjoy things in my life quite a lot.
(b) If I had a serious illness I would still be able to enjoy things in my life a little.
(c) If I had a serious illness I would be almost completely unable to enjoy things in my
life.
(d) If I had a serious illness I would be completely unable to enjoy life at all.

2.

(a) If I developed a serious illness there is a good chance that modern medicine would be
able to cure me.
(b) If I developed a serious illness there is a moderate chance that modern medicine
would be able to cure me.
(c) If I developed a serious illness there is a very small chance that modern medicine
would be able to cure me.
(d) If I developed a serious illness there is no chance that modern medicine would be able
to cure me.

3.

(a) A serious illness would ruin some aspects of my life.
(b) A serious illness would ruin many aspects of my life.
(c) A serious illness would ruin almost every aspect of my life.
(d) A serious illness would ruin every aspect of my life.

4.

(a) If I had a serious illness I would not feel that I had lost my dignity.
(b) If I had a serious illness I would feel that I had lost a little of my dignity.
(c) If I had a serious illness I would feel that I had lost quite a lot of my dignity.
(d) If I had a serious illness I would feel that I had totally lost my dignity.
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Appendix J
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support
(MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988).
1----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5-----------------6-----------------7
Very Strongly
Neutral
Very Strongly
Disagree
Agree
1. _____ There is a special person who is around when I am in need.
2. _____ There is a special person with whom I share my joys and sorrows.
3. _____ My family really tries to help me.
4. _____ I get the emotional help and support I need from my family.
5. _____ I have a special person who is a real source of comfort to me.
6. _____ My friends really try to help me.
7. _____ I can count on my friends when things go wrong.
8. _____ I can talk about my problems with my family.
9. _____ I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows.
10. _____ There is a special person in my life who cares about my feelings.
11. _____ My family is willing to help me make decisions.
12. _____ I can talk about my problems with my friends.
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Demographics
Sex
Male

Female

Other

Age
Age:
Marital
Marital Status (check one):
Single
In a relationship, not married
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Education
Education:
Elementary to 8th grade
Some high school (no diploma)
High school graduate (diploma)
Some college, no degree
Associate Degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree
Doctorate degree
Other
Race
Race (check one):
White/Caucasian
African-American/Black
Asian
Native American
Other – Please list:
Ethnicity
Ethnicity (check one):
Hispanic/Latino
Not Hispanic/Latino
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Employment
What is your current employment status?
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Not employed and looking for work
Not employed and not seeking work
Retired
Other
Income
What is your annual family income?
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $69,999
$70,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $89,999
$90,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more
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Appendix L
Individual Risk Scenarios
Descriptive statistics for each of the three risk scenarios were computed by age group and
video condition (Table S1). Overall, risk taking scores were relatively low across all participants.
Older adults were significantly less risk taking than younger adults on the ankle fracture
scenario, but there were no significant age differences for the cancer and stroke scenarios.
However, there was a trend whereby older adults’ risk taking scores were lower than younger
adults’ scores for the cancer and stroke scenarios. There were also no significant differences in
risk taking between the neutral and sad video conditions for any of the three risk scenarios.
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Table S1
Descriptive Statistics for Each Risky Scenario by Age Group and Video Condition

Variable

Age Group
Younger
Adult
Older Adult
(n = 128)
(n = 142)

Video Condition
Neutral
Sad
Condition
Condition
(n = 137)
(n = 133)

Total
(n = 270)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

Cancer scenario

3.22(1.77)a

3.14(1.90)a

3.10(1.83)a

3.26(1.85)a

3.18(1.84)

Stroke scenario

2.78(1.76)a

2.34(1.73)a

2.45(1.74)a

2.65(1.77)a

2.55(1.75)

Ankle fracture scenario
2.85(1.80)a
2.06(1.53)b
2.41(1.70)a
2.45(1.72)a
2.43(1.71)
Note. Means with different subscripts under the column of Age Group indicates significant
differences between younger and older adults (p < .05). Means with different subscripts under
the column of Video Condition indicates significant differences between the neutral and sad
condition (p < .05).
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Appendix M
Exploring the Moderating Effects of Negative Affect
To explore whether baseline negative affect moderated the effects of age group or video
condition on risky medical decision making, two moderation analyses were conducted using the
PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2017; Model 1). For the first analysis, age group (younger,
older) was entered as the independent variable, negative affect at baseline as the moderator, and
risky medical decision making as the dependent variable (see Figure S1). Baseline positive
affect, health anxiety, social support, uncertainty, situational control, race, employment, and
video condition were entered as covariates. The interaction between age and baseline negative
affect was not significant, (b = -0.38, p = .13).
For the second analysis, video condition (neutral, sad) was entered as the independent
variable, negative affect at baseline as the moderator, and risky medical decision making as the
dependent variable (see Figure S2). Age group, health anxiety, social support, uncertainty,
situational control, race, and employment were entered as covariates. The interaction between
video condition and baseline negative affect was not significant, (b = -0.39, p = .10).
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Figure S1. Conceptual moderation analysis to test the interaction between age group and baseline
negative affect on risky medical decision making, while controlling for video condition, baseline
positive affect, health anxiety, social support, uncertainty, situational control, race, and
employment.
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Figure S2. Conceptual moderation analysis to test the interaction between video condition and
baseline negative affect on risky medical decision making, while controlling for age group,
health anxiety, social support, uncertainty, situational control, race, and employment.
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Appendix N
Understanding the Association between Age and Risky Decision Making
To explore whether perceived risks and benefits of the treatment options were important
for understanding age and risky decision making, bivariate correlations among age, risky medical
decision making, and perceived risks and benefits of the treatments were conducted (see Table
4). Older age was significantly related to perceiving greater risks and less benefits of Treatment
B (higher risk option) relative to Treatment A (lower risk option). Greater risky decision making
was associated with perceiving less risks and greater benefits of Treatment B (higher risk option)
relative to Treatment A (lower risk option).
A mediation analysis was conducted with age group as the independent variable (x
variable), perceived risks and perceived benefits as the mediator variables (m variables), and
risky medical decision making as the dependent variable (y variable) (see Figure S3). Negative
affect, positive affect, health anxiety, social support, uncertainty, situational control, race,
employment, and video condition were entered as covariates. There was not a significant indirect
effect of age on risky decision making through perceived risks (b = -.05, 95% CI [-.15, .003]) nor
perceived benefits (b = .12, 95% CI [-.27, .01]). The direct effect of older age on risky decision
making (b = 0.05, p = .78) became even stronger (b = 0.22, p = .24). Thus, there was a
suppressor effect. Additionally, older age was related to greater risky decision making after
accounting for the covariates and indirect path.
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Figure S3. Conceptual mediation analysis to test the indirect effect of age group on risky medical
decision making through perceived risks and perceived benefits of the treatment options. Video
condition, negative affect, positive affect, health anxiety, social support, uncertainty, situational
control, race, and employment included as covariates.
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Appendix O
Understanding the Association between Negative Affect and Risky Decision Making
Bivariate correlations (Table 4) indicated that baseline negative affect was associated
with greater risky medical decision making, as well as perceiving Treatment B (higher risk
option) as less risky and more beneficial than Treatment A (lower risk option). Greater perceived
risks of Treatment B (higher risk option) relative to Treatment A (lower risk option) was
associated with less risky medical decision making, whereas greater benefits of Treatment B
(higher risk option) relative to Treatment A (lower risk option) was also associated with greater
risky medical decision making.
To explore whether perceived risks and benefits of the treatment options accounted for
the association between negative affect and risky decision making, a parallel mediation analysis
was conducted. Negative affect at baseline was entered as the independent variable (x variable),
perceived risks and benefits of the treatments as the mediator variables (m variables), and risky
medical decision making as the dependent variable (y variable). There was a significant indirect
effect of negative affect on risky decision making through perceived risks (b = .04, 95% CI
[.003, .12]) and perceived benefits (b = .09, 95% CI [.03, .17]). The direct effect of negative
affect at baseline on risky decision making (b = 0.56, p < .001) was reduced (b = 0.43, p < .001).8
This suggested that negative affect was related to greater risky decision making because
Treatment B (higher risk) was perceived as less risky and more beneficial than treatment A
(lower risk).

8

The indirect effect of negative affect on risky decision making through perceived risks (b = .03,
95% CI [.001, .10]), but not perceived benefits (b = .03, 95% CI [-.04, .11]), remained significant
after accounting for age group, video condition, race, employment, uncertainty, situational
control, health anxiety, and social support.
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Appendix P
Pilot Study
Limited work has examined age differences in response to emotion induction video clips
using a U.S. sample. Thus, a pilot study was conducted to test the efficacy of emotionally
evocative video clips in younger and older adults. There were two sad videos and two neutral
videos. Aim one was to explore which video per target emotion was more effective at eliciting
the target emotion. Aim two was to explore whether there were age differences in emotion
ratings following each video clip. Aim three was to explore the discreteness of the target emotion
following each video clip.
Methods
Participants.
Participants (N = 381) living within the United States were recruited through TurkPrime.9
A stratified sampling strategy was used to recruit an age diverse sample: 193 younger adults
(aged 18-38, Mage = 27.62, SD = 4.16) and 188 older adults (aged 60-88, Mage = 65.78, SD =
4.79). The majority of participants were female (68%) and White (75.8%).
Procedure
Participants were recruited through TurkPrime and were informed that the study’s
purpose was to examine people’s beliefs and feelings. All participants were required to have
demonstrated high performance (95% or higher) on human intelligence tasks (HITs). Participants
with duplicate geolocations and IP addresses were blocked from completing the survey.
Participants completed the study measures as part of a larger study. Each participant received a

9

Participants (N = 997) were recruited as part of a larger project on emotion induction videos.
Those who were excluded were assigned to other emotion conditions (i.e., anger, happiness,
disgust) that were not relevant for my dissertation.
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$1.00 honorarium in exchange for approximately 30 minutes of their time. The study was
approved by the West Virginia University Institutional Review Board.
After providing consent, participants reported their age. Next, they completed a measure
of baseline mood. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (two
sad and two neutral) and watched their respective video clip.10 This was a between-subjects
design where participants only watched one video. Following the video induction, participants
completed another measure of mood as a manipulation check. Lastly, participants provided their
demographic information.
Materials
Four video clips were selected, with two videos used to induce sadness and two videos to
induce a neutral state. All videos were from commercially available films or internet programs.
Sadness. Two video clips were selected to induce sadness. The Champ (Gilman et al.,
2017; Hewig et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2004) and Marley and Me (Schwartz et al., 2018) have
been used in prior work to induce sadness.
Neutral. Two video clips were selected to a neutral state. National Geographic special of
the Great Barrier Reef (Lerner et al., 2004) and a video of nature scenes.
Measures
Baseline mood. An adapted version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) with additional adjectives included was used to assess mood at
baseline. These additional adjectives were added to reflect the emotions of interest. Participants
rated the extent to which they felt five positive (e.g., happy, amused) and five negative emotions

10

In the larger study, there were 10 conditions total. There were four discrete emotion conditions
(i.e., sadness, anger, happiness, disgust) with two conditions per emotion, as well as two neutral
conditions
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(e.g., sad, angry) on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Items were
averaged to compute total positive (α = .63) and negative mood (α = .89) scores with higher
scores indicating more positive and negative mood, respectively.
Emotional intensity. An adapted version of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) with
additional adjectives included was used to assess participants’ intensity of emotion following the
induction videos. Three adjectives were used to assess sadness (e.g., unhappy), anger (e.g., mad),
happiness (e.g., joyful), and a neutral state (e.g., unemotional). Two adjectives were used to
assess disgust (e.g., repulsed). An additional twelve adjectives were used as fillers (e.g., scared).
Participants rated the extent to which they felt each emotion on a scale from 1 (very slightly or
not at all) to 5 (extremely). Items were averaged to compute total sadness (α = .92), anger (α =
.95), disgust (α = .91), happiness (α = .93), and neutral (α = .78) scores. The average score of
each target emotion represented emotional intensity.
Preliminary Analyses
Two independent t-tests were conducted to assess age differences in baseline positive and
negative mood. Younger adults (M = 1.44, SD = 0.74) reported a significantly greater negative
mood than older adults (M = 1.20, SD= 0.41), t(299.78) = 3.80, p < .001. There were no age
differences in positive mood t(379) = 0.01, p = .99.
Main Analyses
Emotional Intensity
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Two ANOVAs were conducted with video clip (video 1 vs. video 2) and age (younger vs.
older adult) entered as independent variables and the target discrete emotion (i.e., sadness,
neutral) as the dependent variable.11
Sadness. There was a significant main effect of video clip, F(3, 185) = 20.44, p < .001,
partial η2 = .10. Marley and Me (M = 3.28, SD = 1.16) produced significantly greater sadness
than The Champ (M = 2.54, SD = 1.12) within the sample as a whole. There was not a significant
main effect of age or interaction between video clip and age (ps > .05). Thus, younger and older
adults did not differ in sadness ratings after watching Marley and Me or The Champ.
Neutral. There was a significant main effect of age, , F(3, 188) = 30.89, p < .001, partial
η2 = .14. Younger adults (M = 2.33, SD = 1.14) reported a significantly greater neutral state than
older adults (M = 1.60, SD = 0.60). There was not a significant main effect of video clip or a
significant interaction between video clip and age (ps > .05).
Emotional Discreteness
Four 5 (emotional intensity: neutral, sadness, anger, happiness, disgust) x 2 (age group:
younger and older) mixed model ANOVAs were conducted to assess differences in the
discreteness of emotions. Age group was entered as a between-subjects variable, and emotional
intensity was entered as a within-subjects variable.
The Champ. There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(4, 199.20) = 122.84, p <
.001). There was no significant main effect of age group (F(1,92) = 2.63, p = .11). The main
effect of emotion was qualified by a significant interaction between age group and emotion,

11

All patterns and significance of findings remained the same when controlling for positive and
negative affect at baseline.
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F(4,199.20) = 3.19, p = .04. Younger adults (M = 1.82, SD = 0.09) reported a significantly
greater neutral state than older adults (M = 1.32, SD = 0.09) after watching the video, p < .001.12
There were no other differences in emotional intensity (ps > .05).
Marley and Me. There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(4, 200.88) = 41.43, p
< .001). Participants reported greater sadness (M = 2.54, SD = 0.12) than anger (M = 1.39, SD =
0.08), happiness (M = 1.50, SD = 0.08), and disgust (M = 1.40, SD = 0.07). Participants also
reported a greater neutral state (M = 2.03, SD = 0.09) than anger, happiness, and disgust. There
was also a significant main effect of age group (F(1,93) = 4.82, p = .03). Younger adults (M =
1.89, SD = 0.07) reported greater overall emotional intensity than older adults (M = 1.65, SD =
0.8). The interaction between age group and emotion was not significant (p = .49).13
Nature scene. There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(4,187.95) = 63.36, p <
.001). There was also a significant main effect of age group (F(1,91) = 4.32, p = .04). The main
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between age group and emotion, F(4,187.95) =
7.13, p = .001. Simple main effects analyses showed that younger adults (M = 2.45, SD = 0.13)
reported a significantly greater neutral state than older adults (M = 1.57, SD = 0.14). There were
no other differences in emotional intensity (ps > .05).
Great Barrier Reef. There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(4, 196.75) =
94.84, p < .001). There was not a significant main effect of age group (p = .048). The main
effects of emotion was qualified by a significant interaction between age group and emotion,

12

All patterns and significance of findings remained the same when controlling for positive and
negative affect at baseline.
13
The main effect of age was not significant when controlling for baseline affect.
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F(4,196.75) = 4.00, p = .02. Simple main effects analyses showed that younger adults (M = 2.20,
SD = 0.13) reported a significantly greater neutral state than older adults (M = 1.64, SD = 0.12).
There were no other differences in emotional intensity (ps > .05).14

14

All patterns and significance of findings remained the same when controlling for positive and
negative affect at baseline.

